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ABSTRACT  
  
The   Eurozone   was   established   in   1999   as   a   common   currency   area   between   11  
member  states  (European  Commission,  2019).  This  grew  to  15  member  states,  and  
now   exists   as   19   member   states   who   use   the   euro   as   their   currency   (European  
Commission,   2019).   The   ECB   governs   the   Eurozone   by   controlling   the   monetary  
policy   across   all   19   Eurozone   member   states   (European   Commission,   2019).  
Countries  within   the  Eurozone  do  not  have  control  of   their  monetary  policy  but  still  
maintain   governance   over   their   fiscal   policy.   Denmark   and   the   UK   are   the   only  
countries  with  formal  opt-­out  agreements  exempting  them  from  Eurozone  membership  
(European  Commission,  2019).  Sweden  does  not  have  such  an  agreement  yet  resists  
Eurozone  membership,  making  it  a  unique  case  within  the  EU.  Sweden  had  a  public  
referendum  in  2003  on  whether  it  should  join  the  Eurozone,  with  Swedes  deciding  not  
to  (Miles,  2004,  p.  155).  This  thesis  uses  a  mixed  method  approach  of  both  qualitative  
and  quantitative  information  to  understand  the  political  and  socioeconomic  reasons  for  
why  Sweden  resists  Eurozone  membership.      
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CHAPTER  1.  INTRODUCTION  
  
This   chapter   focuses   on   the   research   questions   and   methodology   that   will   be  
employed  in  this   thesis.  First,   this  chapter  will  begin  by  outlining  the  main  research  
question,  followed  by  the  three  sub-­questions.  Second,  the  methodology  employed  in  
this   thesis   will   be   explained   and   validity   concerns   will   be   addressed.   Finally,   this  
chapter  will   provide  an  overview  of   delimitations  and  definitions  of   the   terminology  
used  in  this  thesis.    
    
  
1.1  Research  outline  and  questions  
    
This   thesis   looks   at   the   Eurozone   and   its   relationship   with   Eurozone   outsiders,  
specifically  Sweden.  It  will  examine  why  Sweden  has  continuously  rejected  Eurozone  
membership.   There   exists   considerable   literature   on   why   Sweden   chose   to   reject  
Eurozone   membership   in   2003.   However,   16   years   on   from   the   referendum   the  
European   landscape  has  changed  significantly  with  phenomena  such  as   the  Brexit  
vote,  rising  populism,  and  the  migration  crisis  (Capelos  and  Nielsen,  2018,  p.  1419).  
All  of  this  impacts  on  desires  for  greater  EU  integration,  including  monetary  integration  
with  regard  to  the  Eurozone.  It   is   interesting  to   investigate  why,   in  the  modern  day,  
Sweden  continues  to  remain  out  of  the  Eurozone.  The  objective  for  this  thesis  is  to  
provide   a   greater   understanding   for   why   this   occurs,   by   investigating   the   political,  
social  and  economic  dimensions  of  Sweden  vis-­à-­vis  Eurozone  membership.  As  such,  
the  main  research  question  asks:    
    
What  are  the  political  and  socioeconomic  reasons  for  Sweden's  resistance  to  join  the  
Eurozone?    
    
This   thesis   will   contribute   to   pre-­existing   literature   by   providing   a   contemporary  
examination  of  Sweden's  restraint  from  joining  the  Eurozone.    
    
It   begins   by   considering   previous   literature   published   in   this   field   of   research.   The  
literature   review   looks  at   the  2003  Swedish   referendum  on  Eurozone  membership,  
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Sweden  and  ERM   II,   as  well   as   literature   focusing  on  Sweden  and   its   relationship  
towards  the  Eurozone  from  2003  onwards.    
    
Following   the   literature   review,   a   theoretical   framework   for   this   thesis   outlines   the  
theory  that  will  be  applied  to  the  analysis.  Realism,  rationalism,  and  constructivism  will  
be   defined,   exemplified   in   context,   and   their   use   justified   by   highlighting   the  
compatibility  of  the  three  theories  within  a  multi-­faceted  theoretical  framework.    
    
To  provide  clarity  in  answering  the  main  research  question,  it  is  broken  down  into  three  
sub-­questions  reflecting  the  three  dimensions  of  interest.  
    
The  first  sub-­question  asks:  What  are  the  political  reasons  for  Sweden's  resistance  to  
join   the   Eurozone?   This   sub-­question   explores   the   various   stances   on   Eurozone  
membership  amongst  Swedish  political  parties.  It  looks  at  the  results  of  recent  general  
elections   in   Sweden,   and   uses   this   to   identify   changes   in   the   Swedish   political  
landscape.  The  perceived  threat  to  Sweden's  welfare  system  in  relation  to  joining  the  
Eurozone   is   examined.   The   legislative   framework   relating   to   Sweden   and   the  
Eurozone  is  also  considered,  with  particular  focus  on  the  euro  convergence  criteria  
and  ERM  II.    
    
The  second  sub-­question  asks:  What  are  the  social  reasons  for  Sweden's  resistance  
to  join  the  Eurozone?  The  second  sub-­question  collates  the  results  of  Eurobarometer  
surveys  to  highlight  social  themes  for  Sweden's  rejection  of  the  Eurozone.  The  krona  
and  the  Eurozone  in  relation  to  Swedish  national  identity  and  sovereignty  is  a  concept  
which   is   considered   as   part   of   this   sub-­question.   Federo-­scepticism   amongst   the  
Swedish  populous  is  another  concept  which  is  investigated  as  a  social  phenomenon  
contributing   to  Eurozone   resistance   in  Sweden.  Finally,  Swedish  public   disconnect  
with   the   elite   is   examined   as   a   contributing   factor   to   social   rejection   of   Eurozone  
membership.    
    
The  third  sub-­question  asks:  What  are  the  economic  reasons  for  Sweden's  resistance  
to  join  the  Eurozone?  This  sub-­question  looks  at  macroeconomic  indicators  such  as  
debt  and  deficit  levels,  GDP,  PPP,  inflation  levels,  and  unemployment  rates.  Monetary  
indicators  are  also  examined,   in  particular   interest  rates  between  the  Riksbank  and  
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ECB  and  exchange  rates  over  time  between  the  krona  and  the  euro.  EBU  membership  
as  part  of  the  Eurozone  framework  is  examined,  with  a  particular  focus  on  efficiency,  
autonomy,  and  the  case  of  Nordea  Bank's  relocation  out  of  Sweden.  Finally,  this  sub-­
question   looks   at   the   Eurozone   debt   crisis   and   considers   phenomenon   such   as  
economic  contagion  and  inter-­union  divisions  as  reasons  that  reinforce  the  Swedish  
decision  to  remain  out  of  the  Eurozone.  
  
A  discussion  chapter  will  recapitulate  and  conceptualise  the  findings  of  this  thesis,  and  
apply  the  theoretical  framework  to  the  phenomena  witnessed.  A  critical  evaluation  of  





As   this   thesis   is   investigating  political,   social,   and  economic   reasons   for  Sweden's  
resistance   to   join   the   Eurozone,   it   will   use   a   mixed   method   research   approach  
combining  qualitative  and  quantitative  data   in  a  complimentary  way   to  address   the  
research  question  (Vicki,  Clark,  &  Ivankova,  2016,  p.  56).  To  understand  the  reasons  
for  Sweden’s  resistance  towards  the  Eurozone  in  relation  to  the  three  dimensions  of  
interest,  both  primary  and  secondary  sources  will  be  examined.  
    
Qualitative  primary  sources  include:    
•   reports,    
•   press-­releases,    
•   publications  of  the  results  of  observations,    
•   laws,    
•   policy  and  legislative  documents.    
  
Qualitative  secondary  sources  include:    
•   journal  articles,    
•   books,    
•   thesis  dissertations,    
•   and  monographs.  
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Quantitative  sources  include:    
•   economic  data,    
•   and  Eurobarometer  data.    
  
Examining   primary   sources,   such   as   interest   rates   published   by   central   banks,   or  
political  parties’  stances  on  issues  based  off  of  their  policy  manifestos,  increases  the  
credibility  of  the  research.  Secondary  sources  are  used  to  support  primary  sources.    
  
Eurobarometer  data  provides  a  credible  alternative   to  conducting  my  own  surveys.  
This   thesis  uses  Standard,  Special,  Flash,  and  Qualitative  Eurobarometer  surveys.  
Eurobarometer  surveys  consist  of  a  large  sample  of  interviews  –  approximately  1000  
in  the  case  of  a  Standard  Eurobarometer  (European  Commission,  2013a).  Standard  
Eurobarometer’s  are  conducted  biannually,  allowing  for  regular  comparisons  of  data  
over  time  (European  Commission,  2013a).    Special  Eurobarometer’s  poll  in  relation  to  
a  specific  topic  or  theme,  and  Flash  Eurobarometer’s  are  data  that  is  gathered  quickly  
and   via   telephone   interviews   as   opposed   to   face-­to-­face   interviews   (European  
Commission,  2013a).  There  may  be  an   issue  of   reliability  with  Eurobarometer  data  
extracted  from  face-­to-­face  interviews  as  interviewees  change  their  behaviour  in  an  
interview   situation.   However,   this   can   be   rectified   through   the   use   of   Qualitative  
Eurobarometer’s,   which   gather   data   based   on   discussion   groups   and   non-­direct  
interviews  (European  Commission,  2013a).    
    
  
1.3  Validity  concerns  
    
The  research  design  of  this  thesis  has  given  rise  to  concerns  surrounding  validity,  and  
how  this  could  impact  on  the  quality  of  the  final  outcome.  Firstly,  there  is  an  inability  to  
undertake  interviews  with  actors  (elites)  that  are  at  the  center  of  this  thesis'  research  
due   to   geographical   and   access   restrictions.   This   does   mean   that   the   risk   of  
imprecision  from  the  interviewer  or  interviewee,  as  well  as  concerns  surrounding  small  
sample  sizes  and  validity,  have  been  mitigated.  However,   interviews  with  actors  of  
relevance  to  this  thesis  would  have  increased  the  overall  credibility  of  the  research.  
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Secondly,   as   a   non-­Swedish   speaker,   translation   issues   for   sources   published   in  
Swedish  present  a  validity  concern.  Online  translation  tools  were  used  at  part  of  the  
research   for   this   thesis,  yet   there  are   issues  of   inaccuracy  surrounding  such   tools.  
However,  for  translated  documents  of  this  nature,  i.e.  policy  manifestos,  the  nuance  
of  terminology  is  not  so  important,  therefore  it  does  not  impact  significantly  on  source  
reliability  and  validity.  Many  sources  are  also  offered   in  both  Swedish  and  English.  
Thirdly,  documents  from  journals,  government  sources,  the  EU,  and  political  parties  in  





Monetary  integration  and  the  Eurozone  is  a  broad  subject;;  therefore,  this  thesis  uses  
several  delimitations  to  clarify  the  scope  of  the  research.  The  first  delimitation  frames  
this  thesis’  research  around  only  Sweden  and  its  relationship  with  the  Eurozone.  Any  
mention   of   other   states   vis-­à-­vis   the  Eurozone   is  merely   to   illustrate  EU  monetary  
integration  in  a  way  which  is  relevant  to  the  Swedish  case.  The  second  delimitation  is  
that  this  thesis  only  investigates  and  analyses  the  Swedish  rejection  of  the  Eurozone  
post-­2003.  It  is  appropriate  to  limit  the  time  span  of  this  thesis'  research,  as  research  
in  the  lead  up  to  the  2003  referendum  was  extensive,  i.e.  the  Calmfors  Commission,  
as  well  as  immediate  post-­referendum  analysis'  by  academics  and  organisations.  The  
third  and  final  delimitation  is  that  only  reasons  for  Sweden's  rejection  of  the  Eurozone  






Euroscepticism  is  a  theme  frequently  referred  to  in  this  thesis  with  regard  to  Swedish  
Eurozone  rejection.  It  is  explained  in  Usherwood  &  Startin  (2013,  p.  1)  as  a  rejection  
of  further  integration  at  an  EU-­level  characterised  by  ‘no’  votes  in  national  referendums  
and  in  relation  to  legislation  in  parliaments  which  calls  for  further  EU  integration.    
  
Eurozone  debt  crisis  
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The  Eurozone  debt  crisis  was  an  economic  crisis  those  arose  within  the  Eurozone  as  
a  result  of  unsustainable  debts  and  a  balance  of  payments  deficit  which  began  at  the  
end  of  2009  (Frieden  &  Walter,  2017,  p.  3).    
  
Federo-­scepticism  
Similar   to   Euroscepticism   (although   not   the   same),   Federo-­scepticism   is   another  
theme  often  referred  to  in  this  thesis.  It  can  be  defined  as  fears  that  the  EU  is  heading  
towards   an   ultimate   goal   of   a   Federal   Union,   and   the   objection   of   any   political   or  
economic  decision   that  would  assist   in   the  accomplishment  of   that   (Miles,  2001,  p.  
207).  The  difference  between  Euroscepticism  and  Federo-­scepticism  is  that  Federo-­
scepticism  focuses  on  the  scepticism  towards  federalisation  as  opposed  to  any  form  
of  EU-­level  integration.    
  
Riksbank  
The  Riksbank   is   the  central  bank  of  Sweden,  ensuring   retention  of  currency  value,  
security  of  payments,  and  money  supply  (Riksbank,  2019b).    
  
Riksdag  
The  Riksdag   is   the   name   of   the   Swedish   parliament.   “The  Riksdag   is   the   highest  
decision-­making  assembly  in  Sweden.  The  tasks  of  the  Riksdag  include  making  laws  
and  determining  the  central  government  budget.  The  Riksdag  also  examines  the  work  
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CHAPTER   2:   SWEDEN   AND   THE   EUROZONE:   A  
LITERATURE  REVIEW  
  
When  considering  the  socioeconomic  and  political  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  
join   the  Eurozone,   previous   literature  must   be   reviewed.   This   literature   review  will  
begin  historically,  analyzing  the  2003  Swedish  referendum  on  Eurozone  ascension.  
Particular  focus  will  be  on  literature  surrounding  the  result  of  the  referendum,  as  well  
as  the  socioeconomic  and  political  reasons  for  the  outcome.  Literature  pertaining  to  
how  Sweden  keeps   itself   out  of   the  Eurozone  will   also  be  considered.  Finally,   this  
review  will  focus  on  more  recent  literature  that  provides  a  more  present-­day  indication  
of  why  Sweden  resists  Eurozone  membership,  focusing  on  the  economic,  social,  and  
political   reasons   for   resistance.   The   literature   review   will   be   summarized   with  
concluding  remarks.    
  
  
2.1  The  2003  referendum  
  
Sweden  was  undecided  on  the  stance  it  would  take  vis-­à-­vis  Eurozone  membership  
in   1999   (Peebles,   2011,   p.   3).   Subsequently,   a   referendum   on   this   issue   was  
scheduled  for  2003.  Swedes  claimed  that  they  were  ill-­informed  about  the  euro  prior  
to   the   referendum   (Peebles,   2011,   p.   63).   Hosli   (2005,   p.   43)   also   reflected   this,  
making   the  point   that   instead  of  Swedes   risking  adopting  a  currency   they  had   little  
understanding   of,   they  would   vote   to   retain   the   krona.  On   the   referendum  date   of  
September  14th,  2003,  82.6  percent  of  eligible  voters  voted  either  ‘yes’  or  ‘no’  to  euro  
adoption  in  Sweden  (Jonung,  2003,  p.  125).  This  presented  a  result  of  55.9  percent  
‘no’  to  euro  adoption,  42  percent  ‘yes’  to  euro  adoption,  and  the  remaining  2.1  percent  
were  blank/invalid  votes  (Jonung,  2003,  p.  125).  Out  of  the  21  Swedish  voting  county  
districts,  19  of  them  voted  against  the  euro  (Miles,  2004,  p.  159).  The  referendum  was  
consultative   in  nature,  yet   the  result  was  adhered  to   for  political   legitimacy  (Polgár,  
2014,  p.  73).  
  
There  were  multiple  socioeconomic   reasons   for   the   result  of   the  2003   referendum.  
Hobolt  and  Leblond  (2009  p.  204)  provide  three  points  for  the  euro’s  rejection  in  the  
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2003   referendum;;   fears   of   losing   sovereignty   and   national   identity,   EU   level  
referendums  being  considered  less  important  than  national  ones,  and  that  countries  
with  the  most  to  gain  economically  (of  which  Sweden  was  not)  are  more  likely  to  join.  
Hobolt  and  Leblond’s  second  point  could  be  disputed  on  the  basis  that  this  referendum  
had  a  turnout  of  greater  than  80  percent,  indicating  that  it  was  of  significant  importance  
to  Swedes.  Regarding  Hobolt  and  Leblond’s  first  point,  Svensson  (2006,  p.  218)  cites  
Swedish  fears  of  euro  adoption  being  a  step  closer  to  an  EU  that  would  be  a  Franco-­
German  centered  super-­state.  The  third  point  was  a  large  factor  in  euro  rejection,  with  
other   Eurozone   countries   doing   poorly   economically   (Svensson,   2006,   p.   219).  
France,   Germany,   and   Italy   (all   major   Eurozone   economies)   were   borderline  
stagnating  at  the  time  of  the  referendum  (Hobolt  and  Leblond,  2009  p.  211).  Whilst  
Sweden  had  high  unemployment  in  2003,  its  GDP  was  up  1.3  percent  (Miles,  2004,  p.  
160).  There  were  no  recent  negative  economic  events  to  spur  Sweden  into  Eurozone  
membership  (Miles,  2004,  p.  160).  On  the  contrary,  Chang  (2009,  p.  51)  discusses  
how  the  history  of  the  1992  ERM  crisis  -­  caused  by  currency  speculation  –  and  what  
it  led  to  (recession  and  unemployment  at  eight  percent  in  the  Eurozone)  would  remain  
in  Swede’s  minds  as  they  voted  in  the  referendum.    
  
Jonung  (2003,  p.  126-­8)  provided  an  economic  assessment  of  euro  area  growth  and  
monetary  policy,  and  it  showed  greater  stability  and  economic  growth  for  states  in  the  
Eurozone,   but   that   a   loss   of   monetary   autonomy   may   make   it   more   difficult   for  
economic   shock   management.   By   remaining   out   of   the   Eurozone,   Sweden   could  
isolate  itself  from  economic  shocks  (Jonung,  2003,  p.  128).  This  is  something  Swedish  
voters  would   consider,  when   deciding   on   relinquishing  monetary   control   over   their  
economy.    
  
Domestic  politics  also  had  an   impact  on  the  outcome  of   the  2003  referendum.  The  
then-­governing  Social  Democratic  party  was  pressured   towards   the   ‘no’   campaign.  
Joining  the  Eurozone  would  mean  that  the  Social  Democrats  would  have  to  give  up  
monetary  policy  as  a  tool  to  tackle  unemployment  –  particularly  because  the  ECB  is  
only   concerned   with   controlling   inflation   (Svensson,   2006,   p.   218).   Furthermore,  
Sweden’s   infamous   welfare   system   may   be   threatened   by   handing   over   such  
significant   financial   autonomy   to   the   ECB   (Svensson,   2006,   p.   220).   Reduced  
unemployment  and   the  welfare  state  are  cornerstone   to  a  center-­left  political  party  
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such  as   the  Social  Democrats.   Jonung   (2003,  p.   130)   identified   that   voters  whose  
wages  came  from  the  public  sector  would  vote  ‘no’  to  the  euro  because  the  size  of  the  
public  sector  would  be  reduced  alongside  tax  revenue.  The  ‘no’  vote  came  from  many  
women,   young   people,   and   low   paid   workers   –   significantly   pressuring   the   Social  
Democrats   towards   the   ‘no’   campaign   (as   their   support   base   is   typically   lower  
socioeconomic  in  nature)  (Svensson,  2016,  p.  221).    
  
A  significant  political  reason  that  gave  strength  to  the  ‘no’  campaign  was  that  the  ‘yes’  
campaign  was  initially  strongly  elite  driven,  and  this  was  a  large  turnoff  (Lindahl  and  
Naurin,  2005,  p.  73).  This  applied  not  only  at  a  national  level,  but  particularly  at  an  EU  
level  as  well.  Figure  1  below  illustrates  this:    
  
Figure  1:  “For  the  euro”  and  Trust  in  the  European  Commission  –  Spring  2003.    
Source:  Jonung,  2003,  p.  145.  
	  
As   represented   in   Figure   1,   Sweden   has   less   trust   in   the   European   Commission  
relative  to  most  other  EU  member  states  (in  2003).  As  the  ‘yes’  campaign  was  driven  
by  the  political  elite  both  in  Sweden  and  within  the  European  Commission,  it  is  clear  
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that  Swedish  distrust  of  the  European  Commission  would  have  been  favourable  to  the  
‘no’  campaign.  Sweden  is  also  the  second  most  anti-­euro  currency  member  state  after  
the  UK.  Based  on  Figure  1,  we  can  see  that  Sweden  is  a  more  Eurosceptic  nation  than  
most   other   EU  member   states.   In   light   of   this,   it   is   not   unsurprising   that   Sweden  
rejected  Eurozone  membership  in  2003.    
  
  
2.2  Sweden  and  ERM  II  
  
To  ascend  into  the  Eurozone,  states  must  fulfill  the  convergence  criteria.  Despite  not  
having   a   formal   opt-­out   agreement   with   the   EU,   Sweden   remains   outside   of   the  
Eurozone   by   deliberately   not   fulfilling   this   criteria   (Chang,   2009,   p.   57).   The  
convergence  criteria  is  comprised  of  five  points;;  harmonized  index  of  consumer  prices  
(inflation  levels),  government  budget  deficit,  government  debt-­to-­GDP  ratio,  exchange  
rate  stability,  and  long  term  interest  rates  (Polański,  2004,  p.  286).  Sweden  fulfills  all  
but  the  exchange  rate  stability  criteria,  as  this  requires  member  states  to  be  a  part  of  
ERM   II   for   typically   two  years   (Polański,  2004,  p.  286).  ERM   II  measures  member  
states’  currency  floating  against  the  euro  to  ensure  that  there  are  no  ‘serious  tensions’,  
and  that  economic  growth  is  not  restricted  (Polański,  2004,  p.  286).  As  member  states  
are  able  to  elect  to  join  ERM  II,  Sweden  has  simply  refrained  from  doing  so,  thus  not  
fulfilling  the  convergence  criteria  and  remaining  out  of  the  Eurozone  (Miles,  2004,  p.  
156).   All   member   states   are   required   to   join   the   Eurozone   eventually   (excluding  
Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  who  have  opt-­out  agreements),  however,  there  has  
not  been  pressure  on  Sweden   to  do  so   (Peebles,  2011,  p.  12).  Despite   this,  Hosli  
(2005,   p.   75-­76)   claims   that   there   will   be   future   pressure   on   Sweden   to   join   the  
Eurozone   as   the   EU   continues   to   more   deeply   integrate   –   especially   considering  
Sweden  does  not  have  an  opt-­out  agreement.    
  
  
2.3  From  2003  to  now:  Sweden’s  rejection  of  the  Eurozone    
  
There   are   a   number   of   economic   arguments   for  Sweden   remaining   outside   of   the  
Eurozone,  particularly  centered  around;;  exchange  and  interest  rates,  trade,  the  GFC,  
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the  EBU,  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis,  and  the  performance  of  Sweden’s  economy  as  a  
Eurozone  outsider.  Unlike  the  UK,  Sweden  is  not  a  major  international  actor,  therefore  
its  reasons  for  wanting  to  remain  outside  of  the  Eurozone  are  more  likely  to  be  internal  
(Hosli,  2005,  p.  75).    
  
An   argument   for   euro   integration   is   to   reduce   exchange   rate   volatility.   Aabo   and  
Pantzalis  (2010,  p.  261)  counteract  this  by  explaining  that  because  European  markets  
trade  predominantly  amongst  themselves,  there  was  little  fluctuation  in  value  amongst  
Pan-­European  currencies  prior  to  the  EMU.  As  a  result,  the  Eurozone  is  not  likely  to  
have  had  a  significant  impact  on  this.  Losing  its  ability  to  set  its  own  interest  rates  by  
conceding  its  monetary  policy  to  the  ECB  is  strong  argument  for  Sweden  to  remain  
outside  of  the  Eurozone.  However,  Reade  and  Volz  (2009,  p.  18)  claim  that  because  
Sweden’s  interest  rates  mimic  that  of  the  ECB’s  –  albeit  100  days  behind  –  Eurozone  
membership  would  have   little   impact  on  Swedish   interest   rates.  Gabrisch  (2017,  p.  
569)  reinforces  this,  and  goes  further,  claiming  that  Sweden  would  in  fact  gain  greater  
control  over  interest  rates  by  participating  in  ECB  policy  making  processes  should  it  
join  the  Eurozone.  Whilst  Reade  and  Volz  make  this  claim,  they  do  so  in  2009  (at  the  
beginning   of   the  GFC   and   pre-­Eurozone   debt   crisis).   The   basis   of   their   argument  
(mimicked   interest   rates)  may  not  be  consistent  nine  years   later  post   the  GFC  and  
Eurozone  debt  crisis.  Holden  (2009,  p.  6)  notes  that  Swedish  business  cycles  have  
become   more   correlated   with   the   Eurozone   since   the   late   1990s,   a   point   that   is  
reiterated  in  Söderström  (2008).  However,  Holden  (2009,  p.  22)  does  not  consider  this  
to  be  a  reason  to  join  the  Eurozone,  and  claimed  that  Swedish  influence  on  ECB  policy  
if  it  were  to  join  the  Eurozone  would  be  minimal  anyway  –  a  point  that  contrasts  claims  
by  Gabrisch  (2017).    
  
Eurozone  membership   is  seen  as  advantageous  to   increasing  trade  when  currency  
barriers  are  broken  down  between  markets.  Roughly  50  percent  of  Swedish  GDP  is  in  
exports,  with  more  than  35  percent  of  this  going  to  the  Eurozone  in  2012  (Österholm  
and  Stockhammer,  2014,  p.  1105).  Despite  this,  trade  between  euro  area  countries  
and  Sweden  has   increased  by   seven  percent   since   the  Eurozone’s  establishment,  
even  though  Sweden  is  not  a  member  (Baldwin,  2006,  p.  94).  It  is  because  of  this  that  
Baldwin  (2006,  p.  52)  believes  Sweden  has  been  clever  from  a  mercantile  perspective;;  
gaining  greater  Eurozone  market  access  without  sacrificing  monetary  autonomy  to  the  
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ECB.   Losing   control   of   monetary   policy   means   subsequently   losing   the   ability   to  
devalue   your   currency   (via   increasing  money   supply   to   cause   inflation)   and  make  
exports   more   competitive,   an   advantage   Sweden   retains   by   remaining   out   of   the  
Eurozone  (Petre,  2015,  p.  505).  Even  if  Eurozone  membership  brought  with  it  inflation  
controls,  Sweden  would  not  benefit  from  this  as  it  has  kept  inflation  low  anyway  (Reade  
and  Volz,  2009,  p.  24).    
  
The  recent  events  of  the  GFC  and  Eurozone  debt  crisis  have  cast  a  poor  reflection  on  
the  Eurozone,  with  Sweden’s  economy   faring  considerably  better  comparatively.   In  
2008  and  2009  Sweden  was  in  a  recession,  but  saw  economic  growth  following  this  
period  of  almost  five  percent  in  2010,  and  a  budget  surplus  in  2011  (Chang,  2016,  p.  
183).  Chang  (2016,  p.  183)  attributes  this  increased  household  consumption  driven  by  
lowered   interest   rates  set  by   the  Riksbank,  and  solid   fiscal  management.  Connolly  
(2013,  p.  204)   identifies  Sweden  as   the  only  EU  member  state   to  keep  a  relatively  
balanced  budget  consistently  throughout  the  GFC,  a  testimony  to  the  prudent  fiscal  
management   referred   to   in   Chang   (2016).   Sweden’s   unemployment   levels   were  
consistently  lower  than  the  Eurozone  and  EU-­average  throughout  the  GFC  (Connolly,  
2013,   p.   203).  During  2010   to   2012  of   the  GFC,  Sweden’s   economy  was  growing  
considerably  more  than  the  Eurozone  average  (which  never  surpassed  two  percent  
during  this  timeframe)  (Connolly,  2013,  p.  202).  The  Swedish  economy  fared  better  
than  the  Eurozone  during  this  period,  meaning  there  appeared  to  be  little  to  gain  by  
joining  it.    
  
Eurozone  membership  equates  to  automatic  membership  of  the  EBU.  Swedish  EBU  
membership   would   mean   handing   over   authority   to   the   ECB   with   regards   to  
overseeing   cross-­border   banking   in   the   Nordic-­Baltic   region   (Spendzharova   and  
Bayram,   2016,   p.   579).  Spendzharova   and  Bayram   (2016,   p.   566)   claim   that   both  
Sweden  and  the  UK  would  benefit  from  the  largest  efficiency  gains  should  they  pursue  
EBU  membership,  however  concerns  surrounding  sovereignty  loss  means  that  joining  
the  EBU  is  not  an  attractive  prospect  for  Sweden.  Elliot  (2012,  p.  28)  explains  that  the  
EBU  fosters  efficiency  by  centralizing  regulations  so  that  the  regulatory  landscape  for  
states  across  borders   is   the  same,  something  which   is  necessary   for  an  efficiency  
multi-­state   banking   system.  However,  Elliot   (2012,   p.   28)   also   recognizes   that   this  
does  not  always  cater  for  situational  differences  in  each  states,  where  local  knowledge  
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and  state-­level  regulations  are  occasionally  more  appropriately  suited.  In  essence,  the  
‘one   size   fits   all’   approach   to   regulation   is   not   always   successful.   Concerns  
surrounding  sovereignty  loss  were  also  echoed  in  Algotsson  (2001,  p.  56)  in  reference  
to  Sweden  diverting  away  from  its  pre-­Maastrict  Treaty  constitution  in  favour  of  greater  
multi-­lateral  governance;;  the  EBU  and  Eurozone  being  examples  of  that.    
  
The   Eurozone   debt   crisis,   specifically   Greece,   had   a   significant   effect   on   the  
perception   of   the   Eurozone   and   Sweden’s   desire   to   join   it.   Eurozone   outsiders,  
including  Sweden,  were   found  to  have  experienced   less  contagion  effects   from  the  
Greek  economic  situation  than  Eurozone  countries  (Bird  et  al,  2017,  p.  5902-­3).  This  
is  because  a  singular  monetary  policy  brings  with  it  risks  and  transfers  of  resources  to  
poorer  countries,  in  this  case,  Greece  (Petre,  2015,  p.  506).  Although,  Petre  (2015,  p.  
509)  claims  that  Eurozone  countries  are  better  protected  from  shocks  which  originate  
outside   of   the   Eurozone.   This   could   be   challenged   on   the   grounds   of   the  
aforementioned  GDP  figures  and  unemployment  levels  for  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone  
throughout  the  GFC.  Sweden  is  able  to  use  the  Riksbank  for  stimulus  spending  and  
devaluation   during   economically   difficult   times   (Patomaki,   2013,   p.   74).   Eurozone  
membership   would   make   this   Keynesian   approach   more   difficult   during   times   of  
economic  crisis.    
  
Joseph  Stiglitz,  a  renowned  political  economist,  claims  that  Sweden’s  decision  to  stay  
out  of  the  Eurozone  was  a  wise  one.  The  common  currency  area  did  not  deliver  the  
economic  growth  promised.  Stiglitz  (2017)  exemplifies  this  by  explaining  that  despite  
the   GFC   originating   in   the   US,   the   Eurozone   still   performed   worse   than   the   US  
comparatively.  US  GDP  was  20  trillion  (USD)  in  2016,  compared  with  12  trillion  (euros)  
for  the  Eurozone  (Stiglitz,  2017).  By  deciding  to  stay  out  of  the  Eurozone,  Sweden  has  
avoided  slow  economic  growth  –  the  opposite  of  what  the  single  currency  originally  
promised.   Aabo   and   Pantzalis   (2010,   p.   262)   also   allude   to   the   lack   of   economic  
growth  that  was  said  to  have  come  about  in  the  Eurozone  from  lowered  transaction  
costs.  The  ECB  focuses  solely  formulating  monetary  policy  to  prevent  inflation,  and  
neglects  alternative  initiatives  such  as  a  Eurozone  wide  unemployment  fund  (Stiglitz,  
2017).  Peebles  (2011,  p.  61)  also  makes  this  claim,  citing  the  US  Federal  Reserve  as  
a  better  example  of  federal  level  banking  that  aims  to  tackle  unemployment,  and  not  
just   inflation.  Addressing  this  could  help  overcome  some  of   the  major   issues   in   the  
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Eurozone   today,   such   as   extreme   levels   of   unemployment   in   some   of   the  
Mediterranean  countries.  The  ECB  is  slow  to  adapt,  and  non-­innovative.  Its  attempts  
at  austerity  and  devaluation  are  continuous.  Stiglitz  (2017)  claims  that  neither  of  these  
approaches  have  been  historically  successful.  Sweden  benefits  by  remaining  exempt  
from  these  monetary  policy  approaches  as  a  Eurozone  outsider.      
  
Despite   pressures   to   join   the   Eurozone,   Sweden’s   economy   has   done   fine   whilst  
retaining  the  krona  (Peebles,  2011,  p.  12).  Sweden  enjoyed  a  booming  economy  up  
until  2008  (Chang,  2016,  p.  182).  From  then  onwards,  it  has  done  comparatively  better  
than   the  Eurozone  (as  previously  mentioned).   In   the   lead  up   to  2009,  Sweden  had  
relatively   less   long-­term   unemployment   than   Italy,   Germany,   and   Greece   (Chang,  
2009,  p.  231).  This   indicates   that  at   the   time   it  had  different  macroeconomic  policy  
needs  –  something  which  a  common  monetary  policy  cannot  deliver  (tailored  specific  
macroeconomic  policies).  This  remains  true  today.    
  
There  are  many  social  reasons  for  Sweden  resisting  Eurozone  membership.  However,  
these  are  not  as  large  as  the  economic  or  political  ones  (Peebles,  2011,  p.  63).  Hobolt  
and  Leblond  (2009,  p.  203)  discuss  how  a  national  currency  is  symbolic  of  a  country’s  
identity.   Citizens   view   currency   strength   from   a   symbolic   rationale   rather   than   an  
economic  one  (Hobolt  and  Leblond,  2009,  p.  203).  As  such,  a  strong  currency  has  
greater  symbolic  value.  This  shows  us  why  short-­term  factors  such  as  exchange  rates  
are   equally   important   as   long-­term   factors   when   considering   referenda.   The   past  
influences  present-­day  social  perspectives  of   the  Eurozone   in  Sweden.  Prior   to   the  
GFC,   Söderström   (2008,   p.   21)   claimed   that   deep   recession   in   the   early   1990s  
influenced  Sweden  to  join  the  EU  in  1994,  and  as  such  Sweden  may  be  spurred  into  
Eurozone  membership  if  the  GFC  affects  Sweden  badly  whilst  the  Eurozone  performs  
comparatively  better.  However,  the  opposite  of  this  has  occurred  (the  Eurozone  was  
hit   harder   than   Sweden   by   the  GFC),   and   as   such   Sweden   is   unlikely   to   join   the  
Eurozone.  Sweden  is  federo-­sceptic  and  distrusting  of  proposals  for  further  integration  
(Lindahl  and  Naurin,  2005,  p.  69).  Persuading  citizens  of  a  Eurosceptic  country  to  vote  
for  further  integration  is  a  difficult  task  (Svensson,  2006,  p.  219).  For  now,  Sweden  is  
a  “hitchhiker”  –  happy   to   remain  a  part  of   the  EU  yet  stay  outside  of   the  Eurozone  
(Chang,  2009,  p.  171).    
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Political  reasons  have  also  contributed  to  Sweden’s  ongoing  rejection  of  the  Eurozone.  
The  Eurozone  is  a  political  project  (Patomaki,  2013,  p.  2).  It  is  driven  by  elites  who  are  
disconnected   with   their   Swedish   constituents   (Hobolt   and   Leblond,   2009,   p.   205).  
Polgár   (2014,  p.  74)  exemplifies   this  by  explaining   that   the  majority  of  Swedes  are  
Eurosceptic,   yet   their   political   class   is   not,   highlighting   the   disproportionate  
representation  of  Swedish  views  at  the  political  level.  According  to  Pridham  (2005,  p.  
17),  relationship  building  and  integration  takes  place  at  an  elite  level,  not  a  common  
one.  This  may  contribute  to  voter  apathy  or  Swedes  feeling  disenfranchised  about  their  
ability  to  be  involved  in  the  relationship  building  process.  The  political  left  and  right  in  
Sweden  are  both  for  and  against  the  euro  (Svensson,  2006,  p.  214).  However,  similar  
to  the  2003  referendum,  fears  that  Eurozone  membership  will  negatively  impact  the  
Swedish  welfare  system  remain  a  large  pull  factor  for  the  anti-­euro  side  (Hosli,  2005,  
p.  75).  Despite  Sweden  turning  its  back  on  an  integral  part  of  the  EU,  it  is  still  seen  
positively  by  the  EU.  Holden  (2009,  p.  18)  recognizes  that  despite  remaining  out  of  the  
Eurozone,  Sweden  as  significant  representation  at  an  EU-­level.  Sweden  is  a  strong  
proponent  of  the  CAP,  yet  against  the  Eurozone,  meaning  that  they  are  key  in  some  
areas   of   the   EU,   and   a   “hitchhiker”   in   others   (Chang,   2009,   p.   171).   Sweden   is  
considered  to  be  more  willing  and  compliant  by  the  European  Commission  than  core  





To  summarize,  the  2003  referendum  had  a  decisive  result  against  the  Eurozone.  In  a  
socioeconomic  sense,  lack  of  information,  erosion  of  sovereignty,  and  poor  performers  
in  the  Eurozone  at  the  time  were  all  reasons  that  gave  strength  to  the  ‘no’  campaign.  
Politically,  parties  were  divided  on  the  issue.  The  potential  threat  to  the  welfare  system  
which  the  Eurozone  posed  was  a  political  pull  to  the  ‘no’  campaign  for  many.  The  then-­
governing   party,   the   Social   Democrats,   were   torn   between   supporting   Eurozone  
membership  or  adhering  to  the  anti-­euro  views  of  their  support  base.  Euroscepticism  
and  distrust  of  EU   level  bureaucracy  was  also  highlighted  as  playing  a  key   role   in  
voting   to   stay   out   of   the  Eurozone.  Sweden’s   refusal   to   participate   in  ERM   II  was  
explained   as   its   method   of   remaining   out   of   the   Eurozone   without   an   opt-­out  
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agreement.  Sweden’s  anti-­Eurozone  rationale  post-­2003  was  also  considered.  Much  
of  the  socioeconomic  and  political  arguments  remained  similar  to  the  ones  that  existed  
at  the  time  of  the  referendum.  However,  the  GFC  and  Eurozone  debt  crisis  are  recent  
phenomena  that  have  contributed  to  a  deepened  anti-­euro  view  in  Sweden.  This   is  
especially  the  case  when  considering  that  Sweden’s  economy  has  out-­performed  the  
Eurozone  from  the  GFC  until  the  present  day.  It’s  ability  to  dictate  its  own  monetary  
policy  in  economically  challenging  times  means  that  Sweden  is  reluctant  to  forgo  this  
for   Eurozone   membership.   Sweden’s   decision   to   remain   out   of   the   Eurozone,  
especially   post-­2008,   has   been   applauded   by   credible   academics   in   the   political  
economy  field.  However,  there  is  a  limited  amount  of  contemporary  literature  available  
regarding  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone  post  the  GFC.  This  leaves  a  considerable  gap,  
especially  when  considering  a  post-­Eurozone  debt  crisis  environment   in  the  EU,  as  
well  as  rising  protectionism  globally.  Whilst  leaving  a  gap,  it  also  presents  itself  as  an  
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CHAPTER  3:  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK  
  
This   chapter   creates   a   theoretical   framework   to   explain   the   political   and  
socioeconomic  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone.  This  thesis  will  
adopt   a   multi-­faceted   framework   using   realism,   rationalism,   and   constructivism   to  
theoretically  explain  the  phenomena  witnessed.  This  chapter  will  define  and  explain  
each  of  these  theories,  exemplify  them  in  context  using  examples  from  the  previous  
chapter  (literature  review),  and  justify  their  selection  for  this  investigation  by  showing  





At  the  core  of  realism  is  the  belief  that  politics  is  not  exempt  from  human  nature,  and  
that  human  nature  is  characterised  by  self-­interest  (Morganthau,  1973,  p.  4).  Wayman  
and  Diehl   (1994,   p.   5)   explain   realism  as  a   view  of   the   international   system  being  
anarchical,  and  sovereign  nation-­states  acting  within  this  system  in  a  self-­interested  
manner.  In  realist  theory,  any  international  institutions  or  laws  which  erode  sovereignty  
or  detract   from  nationalism  are   typically  opposed   (Wayman  and  Diehl,  1994,  p.  5).  
Donnelly  (2000,  p.  9)  offers  a  definition  of  realism  which  encompasses  all  of  the  above;;  
“Realism  emphasizes  the  constraints  on  politics   imposed  by  human  nature  and  the  
absence   of   international   government.   Together,   they   make   international   relations  
largely  a  realm  of  power  and  interest”.  In  a  political  economy  sense,  realism  shares  a  
similar  doctrine  with  mercantilism.  Mercantilists  see  trade  as  a  source  of  value  and  
profitability,  and  that  the  state  plays  a  role  in  ensuring  this  as  well  as  fostering  unequal  
trade  in  said  states  favour  (Magnusson,  1978,  p.  114).  Essentially,  this  is  the  idea  of  
self-­interested   government   engaging   in   protectionist   trade   practices   to   bring   about  
self-­gain  through  trade  and  economic  exchange.    
  
The   realist   school   of   thought,   both   in   terms   of   international   relations   and   political  
economy,   provides   a   lens   through   which   to   understand   Swedish   rejection   of   the  
Eurozone.  For  example,  Hobolt  and  Leblond  (2009,  p.  204)  noted  fears  of  sovereignty  
erosion  and   loss  of  national   identity  as   reasons   for   the   rejection  of   the  euro   in   the  
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Swedish  2003  referendum.  This  is  consistent  with  the  realist  idea  that  any  international  
institution  (in  this  case  the  Eurozone)  which  takes  away  sovereignty  will  be  opposed.  
The   theme   of   concerns   surrounding   sovereignty   loss   were   also   referred   to   by  
Spendzharova  and  Bayram  (2016,  p.  566)  when  mentioning  why  Sweden  does  not  
join  the  EBU,  which  can  also  be  understood  through  the  realist  lens.  Swedish  federo-­
scepticism  and  distrust  of  further  integration,  as  outlined  by  Lindahl  and  Naurin  (2005,  
p.   69),   coupled  with  Hobolt   and  Leblond’s   (2009,   p.   218)   explanation  of  Eurozone  
membership  being  seen  as  a  step  closer  to  a  Franco-­German  dominated  federal  super  
state,  are  further  examples  of  opposition  to  an  institution  (the  Eurozone)  that  erodes  
sovereignty.  Realism’s  focus  on  nation-­state  power  and  self-­interest  is  also  witnessed  
in  the  Swedish  case.  The  loss  of  the  Swedish  national  currency  as  a  subsequent  result  
of  Eurozone  membership  would  be  perceived  as  a  loss  of  strength  by  many  Swedes,  
because  a  national  currency  is  a  symbol  of  power  and  strength  (Hobolt  and  Leblond,  
2009,  p.  203).  As  such,  the  retention  of  the  krona  through  Eurozone  rejection  can  also  
be  explained  as  a  perceived  retention  of  power.  In  terms  of  political  economy,  Baldwin  
(2006)   provides   an   example   of   mercantilist   trade   practices.   He   uses   the   term  
“mercantile”   to  describe   the  manner   in  which  Sweden  has  managed  to   increase   its  
trade  with  the  Eurozone,  whilst  not  having  to  sacrifice  its  monetary  policy  autonomy  to  
join  the  Eurozone  (Baldwin,  2006,  p.  52).    
  
Whilst   realism   may   offer   a   viable   theory   for   Sweden’s   rejection   of   Eurozone  
membership,   it   is  not  consistent  with   the  concept  of  multi-­lateral  governance   in   the  
form  of   the  EU  and  Eurozone   (as   realist   thought  believes   the   international   system  
exists  in  a  state  of  anarchy).  Nor  does  it  explain  how  Sweden  is  an  enthusiastic  EU  
member   state   regarding   other   forms   of   European   integration,   exemplified   by   the  
“hitchhiker”   concept   explained   by   Chang   (2009,   p.   171)   in   reference   to   Swedish  
enthusiasm   for   the  CAP.  Hence   it   is  appropriate   to  consider  other   theories  as  well  





Rationalism  is  defined  by  Pettman  (2001,  p.  23)  as  “the  use  of  human  reason  as  an  
end   in   itself”.  Reason   is  knowing  what  course  of  action  will  bring  about   the  desired  
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result,   based   on   previous   experiences   and   logical   thinking   (Pettman,   2001,   p.   4).  
Jupille,  Caporaso,  and  Checkel  (2003,  p.12)  explain  rationalism  as  actors  acting  in  a  
way   in  which   is  most   likely   to  deliver  said  actors  desired  outcome.  Rational  choice  
theory  offers  an  understanding  of  rationalism  in  an  economic  context.  Rational  choice  
theory   rests  on   the  premise   that   individuals  are   rational,  and  will   elect  a  course  of  
action  (from  available  alternatives)  that  is  most  likely  to  bring,  in  an  economic  sense,  
material  gain  (Oppenheimer,  2012,  p.  13-­14).  The  defining  difference  of  rationalism  
compared   to   other   theories   is   that   it   exists   as   a   mid-­point   between   realism   and  
liberalism.   Liberalism   is,   at   its   core,   an   individualistic   philosophy   that   considers  
everyone   an   equal   regardless   of   background   or   identity   (Kelly,   2005,   p.   9).   In  
international  relations,  it  is  characterised  by  ideas  such  as  free  trade  and  multi-­lateral  
co-­operation.   Between   realist   pessimism   and   globalist   liberal   optimism   exists  
internationalist   rationalism   (Pettman,   2001,   p.   128).   Realism   is   described   as  
pessimistic  because  of  its  view  of  humanity  as  a  self-­interested  power  struggle  against  
one  another,  where  genuine  co-­operation  does  not  exist  beyond  national  borders.  On  
the  other  hand,  liberalism  is  considered  optimistic  as  it  considers  everyone  of  equal  
stature   and   believes   in   international   co-­operation.   The   key   difference   between  
rationalism  and   realism  with   regard   to   this   thesis   is   that   rationalism  recognises   the  
existence   of   international   institutions,   whilst   realism   does   not.   In   saying   this,  
rationalism   can   exist   alongside   other   theories,   including   realism.   Realism   is   a  
pessimistic  view  of  human  nature,   it  views  economics   in  a  mercantile  manner,  and  
sees  societies  as  nationalistic.  Rationalist  thought  can  exist  within  such  realist  views,  
as  an  actor  can  make  decisions  based  on  reason,  experience,  and  logic  within  a  realist  
mindset  (Pettman,  2001,  p.  158).  There  is  not  one  overall  rational  and  perfect  way  of  
acting  based  upon  sound  reason.    
  
Rationalism  can  be  used  to  explain  Sweden’s  resistance  to   join   the  Eurozone.  The  
ideas   of   reason,   logic,   rational   choice,   and   desired   outcome   can   be   seen   with  
examples   given   in   the   previous   chapter.   Hosli   (2005,   p.   43)   states   that   Swedes  
rejection  of  the  euro  in  the  2003  referendum  occurred  because  the  population  was  ill-­
informed  about  the  currency.  From  a  rationalist  perspective,  the  logic  employed  by  the  
voting  populous  in  this  example  is  clear;;  Swedes  did  not  risk  voting  for  something  they  
knew   little  about.  Another   reason   for  Sweden  voting  against  euro  adoption   in  2003  
was   that   the  Eurozone  economy  was  performing  worse   than  Sweden’s   (Svensson,  
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2006,  p.  219).  Looking  at   this   through  a  rationalist   lens,   it   is  evident   that  economic  
comparison,  which  showed  Sweden’s  economy  in  a  better  light,  provided  the  reason  
for  Swedes  to  vote  in  the  way  that  they  did.  The  Swedish  welfare  system  is  revered  in  
Sweden   and   a   vote   to   stay   out   of   the  Eurozone  was   a   vote   to   secure   its   funding  
structure   via   the   retention  of  monetary  policy  autonomy   (Svensson,   2006,   p.   220).  
Understanding  this  through  rational  choice  theory,  this  is  a  rational  choice  (voting  no  
to  Eurozone  membership)  to  achieve  material  gain  and  desired  outcome,  that  being  
the  security  of  the  Swedish  welfare  system’s  funding  structure.    
  
Rationalism  believes  that  actors  act  within  structures  (such  as  institutions),  and  that  
this  has  an  influence  on  actors’  behaviour  (Jupille,  Caporaso,  and  Checkel,  2003,  p.  
13).   Jupille,   Caporaso   and   Checkel   (2003,   p.   13)   identify   the   similarity   of   this   to  
constructivism,   and   claim   that   rationalism   and   constructivism   are   therefore  





Green   (2001,   p.   14)   describes   constructivism   as   the   “social   construction   of  
everything”.  Essentially,  the  sphere  in  which  actors  behave  in  is  not  just  a  material  one  
but  also  a  social  sphere,  and  within  these  two  spheres  the  behaviour  and  interests  of  
actors  are   influenced   (Jupille,  Caporaso  and  Checkel,  2003,  p.  14).  Constructivism  
maintains  that  actors  are  influenced  by  other  actors  as  well  as  their  surroundings  within  
the  aforementioned  spheres  (Green,  2001,  p.  37).  Constructivists  see  the  international  
system   as   a   social   construct   (Wendt,   1999,   p.   1).   When   applied   to   international  
relations,  constructivism  believes   that  social   facts  emerge  as  a   result  of   interaction  
between  humans  (Adler,  1997,  p.  323).  Constructivism  is  about  identity,  and  actors’  
behaviour  within  the  international  system  in  a  manner  that  will  preserve  this  identity  
(Wendt,  1999,  p.  233).  When  applying  constructivist  theory  to  investigative  research,  
an  excerpt  from  Green  (2001,  p.  21)  succinctly  outlines  what  is  sought  to  be  explained;;  
“the  socio-­political  world  is  constructed  by  human  practice,  and  constructivism  seeks  
to  explain  how  this  construction  takes  place”.    
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Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone  can  be  understood  though  a  constructivist  
lens.  Culturally,  Sweden  has  strong  egalitarian  tendencies  (Scroope,  2019).  Using  the  
previously  mentioned   example   of   Sweden   staying   out   of   the  Eurozone   in   order   to  
retain  the  funding  structure  of  its  welfare  system,  constructivists  would  attribute  this  to  
Sweden’s   cultural   desire   for   an   egalitarian   society.   Green’s   (2001)   description   of  
constructivism   as   everything   being   a   social   construction   can   also   be   seen   from  
examples  in  chapter  2.  Söderström  (2008,  p.  21)  wrote  prior  to  the  GFC  that  because  
Sweden  signed  up  to  EU  membership  in  1994  as  a  result  of  deep  recession  in  Sweden  
in   the  early  1990s,  perhaps   they  may  be  spurred   into  Eurozone  membership   if   the  
Eurozone  economy  fares  considerably  better  than  the  Swedish  economy  throughout  
this  period.  Constructivism  would  highlight  the  impact  that  a  dark  economic  history  has  
had   in   shaping   social   perceptions,   and   how   the   forthcoming   GFC   (at   the   time   of  
Söderström’s  (2008)  publication)  may  construct  social  perceptions  in  Sweden  towards  
Eurozone  membership.  The  idea  of  social  construction  impacting  on  outcomes  is  also  
witnessed  when  Pridham  (2005,  p.  17)  refers  to  relationship  building  and  integration  
occurring  at  an  elite  level  as  opposed  to  a  common  one.  Approaching  this  with  social  
construction   in   mind,   one   may   contribute   public   disconnection   with   elites,   voting  
apathy,  and  feeling  disenfranchised  to  their  (the  general  public)   lack  of  ability  to  be  
involved  in  this  relationship  building  process.    
  
Some   authors   claim   that   constructivism   and   rationalism   are   somewhat   similar.  
Constructivism   exists   in   between   rationalism   and   relativism   (Green,   2001,   p.   20).  
Constructivism  recognises  that  the  global  political  system  can  no  longer  be  considered  
an  arena  of  nation-­state  against  national-­state,  as  international  institutions  now  exist  
(Green,  2001,  p.  12).  It  is  in  this  sense  that  constructivism  shares  a  strong  similarity  
with   rationalism.   However,   others   claim   that   constructivism   does   not   challenge  
traditional   political   theories,   such   as   realism.   Adler   (1997,   p.   323)   believes  
constructivism  is  altogether  different  from  such  theories.  If  constructivism  is  external  
to  other  traditional  political  theories,  then  it  is  able  to  exist  within  a  framework  alongside  
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The  three  theories  employed  in  this  theoretical  framework  are  applicable  to  the  three  
spheres  of  interest  in  this  thesis;;  political,  social,  and  economic.  By  exemplifying  these  
theories  in  context  using  excerpts  from  chapter  2,  this  chapter  has  demonstrated  that  
these  theories  can  adequately  explain  phenomena  witnessed  within  the  subject  of  this  
thesis.   This   chapter   has   explained   how   these   theories   are   compatible   and   do   not  
render  one  or  the  other  null  and  void.  Instead,  where  one  theory  may  not  be  able  to  
offer   an   explanation   the   other   can.   This   was   seen   in   the   case   of   realism   not  
recognising   the   existence   of   the   international   system   whilst   rationalism   did;;   yet  
understanding  how  this  does  not  make  either  theory  incompatible  with  one  another.  
Their  compatibility  was  explained  by  the  existence  of  rationalist  thought  within  realism.  
Constructivism’s  recognition  of  social  interaction  and  structures  as  an  explanation  for  
phenomena  witnessed  was  another  example  of  one   theory  offering  an  explanation  
where  the  others  cannot,  as  this  is  something  the  other  two  theories  do  not  consider.  
Constructivism  externality  from  the  other  two  theories  makes  it  a  compatible  theory  
within  this  framework.  Overall,  these  theories  are  applicable  to  the  type  of  content  this  
thesis  will   investigate,   they   are   interoperable,   and   they   offer   explanations   in   areas  
where   the   other   theories   fall   short.   As   such,   this   is   an   appropriate   multi-­faceted  
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CHAPTER  4:  POLITICAL  REASONS  
  
The   authority   for   resisting   or   implementing   Swedish   Eurozone   membership   is   a  
political  one,  lying  with  both  Sweden  and  the  EU.  Domestic  party  politics  in  Sweden  
and   EU-­level   politics   in   the   form   of   the   founding   treaties   play   a   role   in   Sweden’s  
resistance   to   join   the   Eurozone.   As   such,   it   is   important   to   consider   the   political  
reasons   of   why   and   how   Sweden   remains   outside   of   the   Eurozone.   This   chapter  
begins  by  investigating  the  eight  political  parties  which  presently  sit  in  the  Riksdag.  It  
looks  at  the  stances  that  each  party  has  on  the  topic  of  future  Swedish  membership  in  
the  Eurozone,  as  explained  in  each  party’s  policy  manifesto.  The  results  of   the  two  
Swedish  general  election  of  2018  and  2014  are  considered,  and  the  changes  in  results  
between  the  two  elections  used  as  an  indicator  of  the  political  mood  in  Sweden  vis-­à-­
vis  Eurozone  membership.  This  chapter  also  explores  the  Swedish  welfare  system  as  
a  reason  for  political  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone.  A  particular  focus  is  given  on  the  
potential   funding   impact   on   the   Swedish   welfare   system   in   a   scenario   of   further  
Eurozone   integration  once  Sweden   is  a  member.  Finally,   this  chapter  analyses   the  
euro  convergence  criteria  by  highlighting  excerpts  from  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  
TFEU,  and  explaining  how  Sweden  uses  the  convergence  criteria  to  remain  out  of  the  
Eurozone  in  the  face  of  pressures  for  all  member  states  to  join.    
  
  
4.1  Political  parties  on  euro  adoption  
  
When  considering  the  political  appetite  for  euro  adoption  in  Sweden,  it  is  appropriate  
to  consider  the  views  of  the  eight  parties  that  make  up  the  Riksdag.    
  
Those  parties  are:    
•   Center  Party,    
•   The  Left,    
•   Sweden  Democrats,    
•   Moderate  Party,    
•   The  Liberals,    
•   Green  Party,    
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•   Social  Democrats,  
•   Christian  Democrats.  
  
The  Center  Party  opposes  euro  adoption  in  replacement  of  the  Swedish  krona.  They  
hold  this  view  on  the  grounds  that  centralized  monetary  policy  from  the  ECB  is  not  well  
tailored  for  each  different  Eurozone  member  state  and  their  needs  in  the  wake  of  the  
2008  GFC  (Centerpartiet,  2017).  The  Center  Party  attributes  increasing  debt,  greater  
unemployment,   economic   bubbles,   and   low   common   interest   rates   to   this  
(Centerpartiet,   2017).   Finally,   they   believe   that   Sweden   should   refrain   from   EBU  
membership  because  it  would  restrict  Sweden’s  ability   to  place  higher  demands  on  
financial  institutions  (Centerpartiet,  2017).    
    
The   Left   are   also   opposed   to   the   euro   replacing   the   krona.   The   Left   are   a   far-­left  
political  party  who  hold  the  belief  that  the  “problems  we  can  now  see  when  Europe’s  
economies  are  in  crisis”  are  a  result  of  ECB  policies  (The  Left,  2018).  The  Left  do  not  
go  beyond  that  statement  to  elaborate  on  their  opposition  to  euro  adoption,  but  it  could  
be  assumed  that  the  economic  woes  they  refer  to  are  similar  to  those  expressed  by  
The  Center  Party  on  its  stance  against  the  euro.    
  
The  Sweden  Democrats  (2017)  –  Sweden’s  far-­right  political  party  –  also  oppose  euro  
adoption,  as  well  as  all  forms  of  EU  integration.  They  cite  loss  of  sovereignty  concerns  
as  their  reason  for  holding  this  stance.    
  
The  Moderate  Party   (2017)  do  not  expressly  state   their  opposition   to   the  euro,  but  
want   non-­Eurozone   countries   to   have   greater   influence   in   financial   and   economic  
matters.    
      
The  Liberals  are  Sweden’s  only  party  that  supports  euro  adoption.  They  believe  that  if  
part  of  the  Eurozone,  Sweden  would  have  more  influence  over  ECB  policy  and  greater  
market  access  to  the  200  million  people  which  make  up  the  Eurozone  (The  Liberals,  
2017).  The  Liberals  (2017)  want  to  see  immediate  EBU  membership  for  Sweden,  as  
part  of  preparation  for  Eurozone  ascension  in  2022.  
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The  Christian  Democrats   (2018)   also   oppose   euro   adoption   at   present.   The   party  
believes  that  before  euro  adoption  is  considered,  the  economic  woes  of  the  Eurozone  
must   be   resolved,   and   the   issue   of   sovereignty   erosion   with   regard   to   joining   the  
Eurozone   be   addressed   (Christian   Democrats,   2018).   If   these   issues   were   to   be  
addressed,  the  Christian  Democrats  (2018)  would  be  open  to  a  future  referendum  on  
Swedish  Eurozone  membership.    
  
The  Green  Party  (2018)  policy  manifesto  does  not  state  anything  in  reference  to  the  
issue  of  euro  adoption.  Interestingly,  neither  does  the  Social  Democrats  (2017)  policy  
manifesto.  This  is  significant  considering  they  are  the  main  governing  political  party  
(at  the  time  of  writing)  in  Sweden.  This  may  also  be  because  the  party  is  divided  on  
the  issue,  and  does  not  have  one  clear  stance  on  whether  or  not  to  pursue  Eurozone  
membership.  Former  Social  Democrat  leader  and  Prime  Minister,  Göran  Persson,  was  
an  advocate  for  Eurozone  membership  despite  there  being  a  divide  amongst  his  party  
(Jonung,  2003,  p.  136).    
  
  
4.2  General  elections  analysis  
  
Comparing  election  results  in  Sweden  from  the  2018  general  election  and  the  2014  
general  election  provides  an  outlook  on  the  political  mood  of  Sweden.  The  results  of  
both  elections  can  be  seen  below:  
  
Table  1:  Results  of  the  2018  Swedish  General  Election  




1.        Social  Democrats   28.26%   100  
2.   Moderate  Party   19.84%   70  
3.   Sweden  
Democrats  
17.53%   62  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  There  are  349  seats  in  the  Riksdag  
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4.   Center  Party   8.61%   31  
5.   The  Left   8%   28    
6.   Christian  
Democrats  
6.32%   22  
7.   The  Liberals   5.49%   20  
8.   Green  Party   4.41%   16  
Source:  Valmyndigheten,  2018.    
    
Table  2:  Results  of  the  2014  Swedish  General  Election  




1.   Social  Democrats   31.2%   113  
2.   Moderate  Party   23.2%   84  
3.   Sweden  
Democrats  
12.9%   49  
4.   Green  Party   6.8%   24    
5.   Center  Party   6.1%   22  
6.   The  Left   5.7%   21  
7.   The  Liberals   5.4%   19  
8.   Christian  
Democrats  
4.6%   17  
Source:  Deloy,  2014.  
  
The  voter  turnout  for  the  2018  and  2014  elections  was  high  (87.18  percent  and  85.81  
percent  respectively),  making  the  election  results  an  accurate  reflection  of  the  political  
mood  in  Sweden  (Valmyndigheten,  2018).  What  is  evident  is  the  surge  in  support  for  
the  Sweden  Democrats,  who  increased  their  vote  share  by  4.63  percent,  giving  them  
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a   13   seat   increase   in   the  Riksdag.   As   the   only   pro-­euro   party,   The   Liberals   have  
maintained  the  second  smallest  vote  share  in  the  Riksdag  at  seventh  place.  Based  on  
the  aforementioned  policy  stances  of  each  political  party  vis-­à-­vis  the  euro,  the  results  
indicate  growing  Euroscepticism  and  little  appetite  for  further  EU-­level  integration.    
    
  
4.3  Euro  adoption  and  the  welfare  state    
  
The   Swedish   welfare   system   is   one   which   is   synonymous   with   Sweden’s   political  
identity   (Czech,   2015,   p.   32).   Sweden   has   a   substantial   welfare   system   that   was  
funded  at  26.1  percent  of  GDP  in  2018  (OECD,  2018).  Due  to  its  popularity,  any  move  
that  would  place  the  Swedish  welfare  system  in  jeopardy  or  out  of  Swedish  control,  
such  as  Eurozone  membership,  comes  with  a  risk  of  parties   losing  political  capital.  
Swedish  preference   to   retain  control  over  such  matters  are   referred   to   in  Standard  
Eurobarometer   69,   which   states;;   “health   and   social   security   are   two   areas   where  
Swedes  prefer  their  own  government  to  make  the  decisions”  (European  Commission,  
2008a,  p.  2).  To  address  the  imbalances  that  occur  within  a  monetary  union  (such  as  
different  member  states’  government  expenditure   levels),   the  EU  could   introduce  a  
fiscal  union  amongst  existing  Eurozone  member  states,   taking  away   their  ability   to  
control   their   own   taxation   and   government   spending,   potentially   resulting   in   a  
reduction  of  welfare  funding  (Czech,  2015,  p.  32).  In  the  instance  of  a  growing  deficit,  
a  euro  area  fiscal  union  could  see  spending  cuts  which  has  the  potential  to  impact  on  
welfare  funding  as  well  (Czech,  2015,  p.  32).  Whilst  these  scenarios  presently  exist  as  
possibilities   as   opposed   to   realities,   the   concern   is   that   once   a   member   of   the  
Eurozone,  further  Eurozone  integration  may  impact  on  the  Swedish  welfare  system  in  
a  way  that  would  see  its  funding  reduced.    
  
  
4.4  Euro  convergence  criteria:  Sweden  and  ERM  II  
  
To  ascend  into  the  Eurozone,  member  states  must  achieve  the  convergence  criteria.  
This  was  originally  outlined  in  Article  109j  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as;;    
•   price  stability,    
•   sustainable  government  finances,    
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•   currency  value  fluctuations  being  “normal”  without  devaluation,    
•   and  participation  in  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism    
(Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities,  1992).    
  
It  has  more  recently  been  defined  –  and  in  greater  detail  –  in  Article  140  of  the  TFEU.  
It  states  the  following:  
  
“—  the  achievement  of  a  high  degree  of  price  stability;;  this  will  be  apparent  from  
a  rate  of  inflation  which  is  close  to  that  of,  at  most,  the  three  best  performing  
Member  States  in  terms  of  price  stability,    
—  the  sustainability  of  the  government  financial  position;;  this  will  be  apparent  
from  having  achieved  a  government  budgetary  position  without  a  deficit  that  is  
excessive  as  determined  in  accordance  with  Article  126(6),  
  —   the   observance   of   the   normal   fluctuation   margins   provided   for   by   the  
exchange-­rate  mechanism  of  the  European  Monetary  System,  for  at  least  two  
years,  without  devaluing  against  the  euro,    
—   the   durability   of   convergence   achieved   by   the   Member   State   with   a  
derogation   and   of   its   participation   in   the   exchange-­rate   mechanism   being  
reflected  in  the  long-­term  interest-­rate  levels.”    
(Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union,  2008).    
  
The  price  stability  criteria  requires  member  states  to  not  exceed  1.5  percent  inflation  
of  the  top  three  performing  member  states  (vis-­à-­vis  price  stability),  with  exceptions  
made  in  the  instances  of  uncontrollable  external  factors  i.e.  global  economic  recession  
(European   Central   Bank,   2018a).   Deficit   to   GDP   levels   are   now   defined   as   not  
exceeding   3   percent,   with   exceptions   being   made   for   external   factors   (European  
Central   Bank,   2018a).   Debt   to   GDP   levels   are   now   defined   as   not   exceeding   60  
percent,   again,  with  exceptions  being  made   for   external   factors   (European  Central  
Bank,   2018a).   Exchange   rate   fluctuations   are   measured   by   member   states’  
participation  in  ERM  II  (which  overrode  ERM  in  January  1999)  for  a  period  of  two  years  
without   “severe   tensions”   or   devaluation   (European  Central   Bank,   2018a).   ERM   II  
works  by  having  an  agreed  central  exchange  rate  between  ‘currency  x’  and  the  euro,  
where   ‘currency   x’   is   allowed   to   fluctuate   15   percent   above   or   below   this   rate  
(European  Commission,  2017a).  ERM  II  prepares  countries  for  Eurozone  membership  
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by  restricting  the  ability  to  change  the  currency  value  to,  for  example,  slow  imports  or  
encourage  exports  (European  Commission,  2017a).  This  forces  countries  to  use  fiscal  
and   structural   policies   for   economic  management,   as   opposed   to  monetary   ones.  
Finally,   long-­term   interest   rate   levels   are   required   to   not   exceed   2   percent   of   the  
benchmark   standard   (the   top   three  performing  member   states  with   regard   to  price  
stability)  (European  Central  Bank,  2018a).  
  
All  EU  member  states  (unless  they  have  an  opt-­out  agreement)  are  obliged  to  join  the  
Eurozone  once  they  meet  the  convergence  criteria.  Stage  three  of  EMU  is  the  basis  




ON  THE  TRANSITION  TO  THE  THIRD  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  
MONETARY  UNION  
  
THE  HIGH  CONTRACTING  PARTIES,    
  
Declare   the   irreversible  character  of   the  Community's  movement   to   the   third  
stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union  by  signing  the  new  Treaty  provisions  
on  economic  and  monetary  union.    
  
Therefore  all  Member  States  shall,  whether  they  fulfil  the  necessary  conditions  
for  the  adoption  of  a  single  currency  or  not,  respect  the  will  for  the  Community  
to  enter  swiftly  into  the  third  stage,  and  therefore  no  Member  State  shall  prevent  
the  entering  into  the  third  stage.    
  
If  by  the  end  of  1997  the  date  of  the  beginning  of  the  third  stage  has  not  been  
set,   the   Member   States   concerned,   the   Community   institutions   and   other  
bodies   involved   shall   expedite   all   preparatory  work   during   1998,   in   order   to  
enable  the  Community  to  enter  the  third  stage  irrevocably  on  I  January  1999  
and   to  enable   the  ECB  and   the  ESCB  to  start   their   full   functioning   from   this  
date.    
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This   Protocol   shall   be   annexed   to   the   Treaty   establishing   the   European  
Community.”  
(EUR-­Lex,    2012).  
  
Both  the  UK  and  Denmark  have  protocols  within  the  Maastricht  Treaty  whereby  there  
is   an   opt-­out   agreement   for   Eurozone   membership.   Unlike   the   other   two   euro  
outsiders,   Sweden   does   not   have   a   formal   opt-­out   agreement   for   Eurozone  
membership.   Instead,   Sweden   refrains   from   participating   in   ERM   II,   therefore   not  





This   chapter   has   compared   Swedish   political   parties’   stances   on   Eurozone  
membership,  revealing  that  only  one  party  was  in  outright  support  of  euro  adoption  –  
The  Liberals.  Interestingly,  the  Social  Democrats  (Sweden’s  main  governing  party  at  
the  time  of  writing)  does  not  have  a  clear  stance  either  way  due  to  internal  divisions,  
and  nor  does  the  Green  Party.  The  five  remaining  parties  all  oppose  euro  adoption,  
with  concerns  of  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis  and  financial  stability  being  echoed  amongst  
those   parties   on   their   rationale   for   this   stance.   The   Sweden   Democrats   and   the  
Christian   Democrats   were   the   only   parties   to   cite   sovereignty   concerns   as   their  
reasoning   for  opposing   the  Eurozone  and   the  EU.  This  chapter  also  compared   the  
election  results  of  the  2018  and  2014  general  elections  in  Sweden.  It  showed  a  clear  
rise  in  popularity  and  political  strength  for  Euroscepticism,  in  the  form  of  the  Sweden  
Democrats.  As  part  of  this  chapter,  the  Swedish  welfare  system  was  also  considered  
as  a  political   factor   that  may  breed  political   reluctance   to  Eurozone  membership.   If  
Sweden  was  to  join  the  Eurozone,  the  possibility  of  fiscal  integration  would  threaten  
funding   to   the   substantive   Swedish   welfare   system.   Any   political   party   that   would  
entertain   this,  may   risk  political  capital,  and  hence   is  unlikely   to  do  so.  Finally,   this  
chapter  looked  at  the  euro  convergence  criteria  found  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  
TFEU.   It  explained  how  as  part  of  stage  three  of  EMU,  member  states  who  do  not  
have  an  opt-­out  agreement  are  obliged  to  aspire  to  meet  the  convergence  criteria  and  
adopt   the  euro.  Refraining   from  participating   in  ERM  II  was   identified  as  Sweden’s  
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method   for   not  meeting   the   euro   convergence   criteria,   and   in   doing   so,   remaining  
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CHAPTER  5:  SOCIAL  REASONS  
  
When   asked   to   think   of   a   word   that   is   associated   with   Europe,   the   second   most  
commonly  associated  by  Swedes  was  “euro”  (European  Commission,  2015a,  p.  4).  
Public  attitudes  towards  Eurozone  membership  are  important  as  this  has  implications  
on   voting   behavior   and   societal   pressures   on   politicians   for   the   direction   Sweden  
should  take  vis-­à-­vis  the  Eurozone.  As  such,  this  chapter  explores  the  social  reasons  
for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone.  Beginning  with  a  brief  overview  of  public  
attitudes  post-­2003,   this  chapter   looks  at  Swedes  attitudes  at   the   time   towards   the  
euro  and  the  EU.  However,  the  primary  focus  is  given  to  more  recent  public  attitudes  
as   it   is   in   keeping   with   the   contemporary   nature   of   this   investigation.   Graphic  
comparisons  and  trends  identify  Swedish  perspectives  on  the  euro,  Swedish  and  EU  
institutions,  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone’s  economies,  and  both  economies  institutions  
in  dealing  with  economic  crises.  Finally,  this  chapter  highlights  the  Swedish  skepticism  
of   federal   integration,   the   civilian-­elite   disconnect,   and   Swedish   fears   of   the  
consequences  that  may  come  as  a  result  of  Eurozone  membership.    
  
  
5.1  The  earlier  years:  post  the  2003  Referendum    
  
Following  the  2003  referendum  on  euro  adoption,  federo-­sceptic  feelings  ran  high  in  
Sweden.  Eurobarometer  data   in  2004  showed  that  Sweden  had  the  highest  rate  of  
mistrust  of  the  EU  compared  to  the  other  EU15  member  states  (35  percent)  (European  
Commission,  2004b,  p.  85).  Swedish  engagement  in  European  democracy  was  also  
low.  For   the  2004  European  Parliament  elections,  Sweden  had  one  of   the  poorest  
voter  turnouts  in  the  EU15,  with  only  37  percent  of  eligible  voters  casting  their  vote  
(European  Commission,  2004a,  p.  26).  Swedes  held  very  negative  perceptions  of  the  
EU.  31  percent  of  Swedes  interviewed  in  a  2004  Eurobarometer  survey  had  a  negative  
image  of  the  EU,  and  26  percent  go  even  further  than  this,  saying  that  they  would  be  
relieved  to  see  the  end  of  the  EU  altogether  (European  Commission,  2004b,  p.  88).  
Two  years  later,  a  Eurobarometer  survey  in  2006  highlighted  that  Sweden  is  adopting  
a  “wait  and  see”  strategy  with  reference  to  further  EU  integration  (including  Eurozone  
membership)  (European  Commission,  2006a,  p.  25).    
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5.2  Graphic  comparisons  and  trends    
  
The  following  graphs  use  Eurobarometer  data  to  create  comparisons  over  time.  These  
graphs   display   Swedes   level   of   opposition   to   the   euro,   trust   in   various   political  
institutions,  and  the  perceived  performance  of  their  economy.  From  this  information,  
this  chapter  deduces  the  social  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone.  
Finally,  this  chapter  outlines  the  most  recent  Eurobarometer  survey  data  in  relation  to  
specifically   why   Swedes   hold   the   perspectives   that   they   do.   A   key   part   of  
understanding  in  greater  detail  the  political  and  socioeconomic  reasons  for  Sweden’s  
resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone,  is  to  confirm  that  the  Swedish  populous  does  in  fact  
still  reject  the  idea  of  introducing  the  euro  in  their  country.  Figure  2  below  looks  at  the  
percentages  of  Swedes  who  oppose  the  idea  of  the  euro  being  introduced  in  Sweden  
from  the  second  half  of  2015  onwards,  giving  a  present  day  snapshot  of  where  Swedes  
sit  in  regards  to  this.    
  
Figure  2:  Percentage  of  Swedish  opposition  to  euro  introduction  from  2015  to  2018  
Source:  European  Commission,  Standard  Eurobarometer  84-­90.    
*(1)  indicates  the  first  half  of  the  year,  (2)  indicates  the  second  half  of  the  year.  
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**The  above  graph  is  measured  from  the  second  half  of  2015  as  that  is  when  Eurobarometer  surveys  
begin  surveying  Swedes  opinions  regarding  euro  adoption   in  recent   times  (previously  surveyed  pre-­
2011).    
  
Figure  2  shows  that  Swedish  opposition  to  the  euro  has  never  fallen  below  65  percent  
in  the  last  four  years.  Euro  adoption  in  Sweden  is  unlikely  unless  the  percentage  of  
those  opposing  the  euro  falls  to  or  below  50  percent.  Figure  2  shows  that  in  recent  
years,  percentages  have  been  nowhere  close  to  the  50  percent  mark.  From  this,  it  is  
clear  that  Sweden  has  not  been  and  is  not  close  to  having  a  majority  which  have  an  
appetite  for  euro  adoption.  However,  there  is  a  notable  reduction  in  euro  opposition  in  
the  second  half  of  2018.  Euro  opposition  falls  6  percent  from  71  percent  to  65  percent  
–  the  lowest  it  has  been  in  the  last  four  years.  The  timing  of  this  drop  in  euro  opposition  
in   Sweden   coincides  with   announced   plans   to   reform   the   Eurozone.   The   reforms,  
aimed  at  increasing  durability  and  being  led  by  French  President  Emmanuel  Macron,  
are   being   negotiated   with   Germany   and   were   reaching   agreement   at   this   time  
(Aftonbladet,   2018a).   This   has   perhaps   created   a   greater   sense   of   security  
surrounding  the  euro.  When  speaking  on  such  reforms,  Swedish  political  party  The  
Liberals  leader  Jan  Björklund,  claimed  that  extensive  reforms  will  shield  the  Eurozone  
from   experiencing   its   exposed   weaknesses   again   as   it   did   during   the   GFC  
(Aftonbladet,  2018b).  At  the  time  of  writing,  data  is  not  available  beyond  the  second  
half  of  2018,  therefore  whether  euro  opposition  in  Sweden  continues  to  fall,  plateaus,  
or  rises  again  remains  a  matter  of  speculation.  However,  I  predict  that  opposition  to  
the  euro  will  plateau  at  its  current  percentage  of  mid-­60s  until  the  outcome  of  these  
reforms  can  be  observed  by  the  Swedish  populous.    
  
Eurozone  accession  results  in  a  handover  of  authority  from  national  institutions  to  EU  
institutions,   notably   the  member   states’  monetary   policy   controlled   by   their   central  
bank  and   influenced  by  national  politics,   to   the  ECB.   It   is  because  of   this   that   it   is  
appropriate   to   consider   the   levels   of   trust   that   Eurozone-­outsiders   have   in   these  
respective  institutions,  in  order  to  greater  understand  why  they  may  or  may  not  reject  
the   Eurozone.   Figure   3   below   shows   the   percentage   of   Swedes   trust   in   these  
institutions;;  the  Swedish  parliament,  Swedish  government,  and  EU  institutions.    
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Figure  3:  Percentage  of  Swedish  trust   in   the  Swedish  parliament,  government,  and  
EU  institutions  from  2011  to  2018  
Source:  European  Commission,  Standard  Eurobarometer  76-­90.    
*The  above  graph  is  measured  from  the  second  half  of  2011  as  this  is  when  Eurobarometer  surveys  
began  surveying  Swedes  levels  of  trust  in  the  various  institutions.  
  
Figure  3  identifies  that  the  level  of  Swedes  trust  in  these  institutions  has  changed  over  
time,  but  the  order  has  not.  Since  the  measurement  began  in  2011,  trust  has  always  
been   placed   firstly   with   the   Swedish   parliament,   secondly   with   the   Swedish  
government,  and  thirdly  with  EU  institutions.  The  first  half  of  2015  is  a  notable  date  as  
the  percentages  of  trust  in  the  government  and  EU  institutions  are  almost  equal  (49  
percent   and   48   percent   respectively).   A   one   percent   gap   in   percentages   of   trust  
between   the   Swedish   government   and   EU   institutions   again   occurs   in   the   most  
recently  surveyed  data  (at  the  time  of  writing)  –  the  second  half  of  2018  (60  percent  
and  59  percent  respectively).  Figure  3  does  show  a  trend  in  the  gap  closing  between  
trust   in   the   EU   institutions   and   the   Swedish   institutions.   What   previously   was   a  
considerable  gap  of  22  percent  between  EU  institutions  and  the  Swedish  government  
in  the  first  half  of  2012  has  closed  significantly  since  then  and  is  now  almost  equal  
today.   The   political   situation   in   Sweden   at   the   time  may   have   contributed   to   this.  
Swedes  were  getting  impatient  with  the  lack  of  bipartisanship  from  the  right  and  left  
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sides  of  the  political  spectrum  when  it  came  to  forming  a  coalition  government  (The  
Local   Sweden,   2018).   This   would   explain   the   plateau   in   support   for   the   Swedish  
government,  considering   that  at   that   time   they  did  not  have  a  government   formally  
established.  Swedish  opinion  towards  the  EU  has  improved  at  the  same  time  as  Brexit  
has  occurred  (The  Local  Sweden,  2018).  This  may  point  to  the  difficulties  Britain   is  
having  with   leaving   the  EU  as   having   detracted   from   the  Eurosceptic   argument   in  
Sweden.   This   can   be   further   supported   by   the   Swedish   Eurosceptic   party,   The  
Sweden   Democrats,   announcement   that   they   are   no   longer   advocating   for   an  
immediate   referendum   on   Swedish   exit   of   the   EU   (The   Local   Sweden,   2019).  
However,  to  this  day  the  order  of  trust  in  the  three  institutions  has  not  changed,  and  
trust   levels   in   EU   institutions   have   never   once   got   close   to   that   of   the   Swedish  
parliament.  Figure  3  has  highlighted  that  Sweden  trusts  its  own  institutions  over  EU  
institutions;;  undoubtedly  a  factor  of  consideration  for  Sweden  when  deciding  to  give  
away  more  of   its  authority   to  EU  institutions  such  as  the  ECB,  as  part  of  Eurozone  
accession.    
  
Joining  the  Eurozone  would  mean  joining  in  unity  –    both  economically  and  monetarily  
–  with  19  other  EU  economies.  When  joining  an  economic  union,  the  perceived  state  
of  the  union’s  economies  is  important  to  compare  against  a  prospective  member’s  own  
economy.  The  differences  in  perception  between  Eurozone  economies  and  Eurozone-­
outsider  economies  may  have  an  impact  on  citizens’  desire  to  become  a  part  of  the  
Eurozone  or  not.  For  example,   if  Eurozone  economies  had  a  higher  percentage  of  
citizens  agreeing  that  their  economy  is  “good”  compared  with  the  Eurozone-­outsider,  
the  Eurozone-­outsider  may  have  stronger  desires  to  join  the  economic  and  monetary  
union,  and  vice-­versa.  Figure  4  below  looks  at  the  percentage  of  Swedes  who  agreed  
with  the  statement  that  the  state  of  their  economy  is  “good”,  and  compares  this  with  
the  EU-­average  response  to  the  same  statement.    
  
Figure  4:  Percentage  of  Swedes  who  think  that  the  state  of  their  economy  is  “good”  
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Source:  European  Commission,  Standard  Eurobarometer  75-­90.  
*  The  above  graph  is  measured  from  the  first  half  of  2011  as  this  is  when  Eurobarometer  surveys  began  
surveying  EU  member  states’  perceptions  of  whether  their  national  economies  were  “good”.  
**Note:  Data  is  not  measuring  how  well  economies  are  performing,  but  how  citizens  of  the  countries  
surveyed  perceive  them  to  be  performing.  
***Data  comparing  the  response  average  of  Eurozone  member  states  was  unavailable.  
  
Figure  4  shows  that  since  2011  there  has  continuously  been  large  disparities  between  
how  well  Swedes  perceive  their  nation’s  economy,  and  how  the  rest  of  the  EU  (as  per  
the  EU-­average)  perceive   theirs.   In   the   last  seven  years,  at   least   three  quarters  of  
Sweden’s  population  have  always  considered  the  status  of  their  economy  to  be  “good”,  
with  the  lowest  point  being  in  the  second  half  of  2012  (75  percent).  In  2011,  88  percent  
of  Swedes  considered  their  economy  to  be  “good”  whilst  only  30  percent  of  the  EU-­
average  thought  the  same.  Fast  forward  to  today  and  whilst  the  gap  between  the  two  
has  narrowed  over  a  seven-­year  period,  the  gap  still  remains  large  with  88  percent  of  
Swedes   rating   their  economy  as  good,  compared   to  a  49  percent  EU-­average.  An  
overwhelming  majority  of  Swedes  perceive  their  economy  as  “good”,  whilst  the  EU-­
average  has  yet  to  go  above  half.  The  following  chapter  (6)  will  conduct  an  economic  
comparison  of  the  Swedish  and  Eurozone  economies,  which  will  offer  an  insight  into  
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why  this  data  is  reflected  in  this  way.  When  engaging  in  a  substantial  shift  such  as  
giving   away   monetary   policy   autonomy   as   part   of   Eurozone   accession,   the   clear  
disparity  been  perceptions  of  economic  wellbeing  would  factor  in  to  Swedes  on-­going  
apathy  for  Eurozone  membership.  
  
The   GFC   affected   national   and   global   markets   alike.   How   macroeconomic   policy  
instruments  are  used  during  periods  of  crisis  have  a   large   impact  on   the  economic  
outcomes   for  countries  subject   to   them.  When  considering  a  hand-­over  of  such  an  
instrument,   like   monetary   policy   as   part   of   Eurozone   accession,   it   is   important   to  
consider  where  institutional  desires  lie  in  circumstances  such  as  these.  For  example,  
if  there  was  strong  favourability  for  national  institutions  to  deal  with  an  economic  crisis  
as   opposed   to   EU   institutions,   it   is   less   likely   that   that   nation   would   hand-­over  
autonomy   to   EU-­institutions,   and   vice-­versa.   Figure   5   below   is   based   off  
Eurobarometer  data  collected  during  a  period  of  the  GFC,  which  asked  Swedes  which  
institution   they   believed   was   best   equipped   to   deal   with   the   GFC;;   their   national  
government  or  the  EU.    
  
Figure   5:  Percentage   of  Swedes   belief   in  which   institution   is   best   to   deal  with   the  
Global  Financial  Crisis  from  2010  to  2014  
Source:  European  Commission,  Standard  Eurobarometer  73-­81.    
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*The   above   graph   is  measured   from   the   first   half   of   2010   to   the   first   half   of   2014   as   this   is   when  
Eurobarometer  surveys  began  surveying  EU  member  states’  institutional  preferences  during  the  GFC.  
**Note:  Other  answers  were  available  in  the  survey  (the  US,  IMF,  G20,  and  “Other”),  but  have  not  been  
included  in  this  graph  as  their  comparison  is  not  relevant  to  this  investigation.  
  
When  surveyed  as  to  which  institution  they  would  prefer  to  have  dealing  with  the  GFC,  
figure   5   shows   that   in   all   but   two   instances,   Swedes   favoured   their   own   national  
government.  In  the  second  half  of  2011,  29  percent  of  Swedes  believed  EU  institutions  
were   best   to   deal   with   the   GFC,   and   only   19   percent   believed   that   the   Swedish  
government  was.  This  is  a  spike  in  support  for  the  EU  in  this  regard,  however,  in  the  
following   survey   of   2012   the   data   shows   a   return   to   favourability   for   the   Swedish  
government   as   the   institution  best   to   deal  with   the  GFC.  The   second  half   of   2013  
shows  support  for  the  Swedish  government  and  the  EU  were  almost  equal,  followed  
by  more  Swedes  favouring  the  EU  in  the  beginning  of  the  following  year.    29  percent  
of  Swedes  voted   in  favour  of   the  EU  to  deal  with  the  crisis   in  the  first  half  of  2014,  
compared  to  17  percent  for  the  Swedish  government.  This  shows  that  towards  the  end  
of   the  GFC,  Swedish  belief   in  EU   institutions   to  deal  with   the  crisis   increased  and  
surpassed  the  Swedish  government.  
  
  
5.3  Sweden  in  the  present  day  
  
Today,  just  as  in  2003,  federo-­sceptic  feelings  remain  high  in  Sweden.  As  the  EU  –  as  
part  of  an  ever  closer  union  –  integrates  further  and  further,  it  raises  fears  amongst  
some  Europeans  that  it  is  moving  towards  a  “United  States  of  Europe”.  Such  a  concept  
has  already  been  proposed  by  German  MEP  Martin  Shultz,  calling  for  a  full  political  
union  and  federal  Europe  by  2025  (Coppola,  2017).  Support  for  the  idea  of  a  United  
States  of  Europe  was  polled  in  a  2014  qualitative  Eurobarometer  survey.  74  percent  
of  Swedes  rejected  the  concept  of  a  United  States  of  Europe  (European  Commission,  
2014b,  p.  87).  As  figures  3  and  5  have  identified,  deeper  institutional  integration  is  not  
something  that  has  resonated  with  the  Swedish  public  in  recent  times.  As  well  as  the  
tendency   to   trust   their  own  national   institutions  above  EU   institutions,  a  disconnect  
between  civilians  and  the  political  elite  may  contribute  to  an  unwillingness  to  sign  up  
to   further   EU   authority   as   part   of   Eurozone   membership.   As   Davis   (2015,   p.   46)  
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explains,   the   civilian-­elite   disconnect   is   caused   by   a   seemingly   self-­benefitting  
exclusive   political   elite   class   which   leaves   voters   feeling   disengaged   and  
disenfranchised.   This   civilian-­elite   disconnect   was   exemplified   in   a   recent  
Eurobarometer  survey  when  quoting   the   thoughts  of  an  anti-­euro  group  of  Swedes  
interviewed;;  “…I  think  about  a  bunch  of  people  in  Brussels.  It’s  them  and  us,  we’re  
separate”   (European   Commission,   2014a,   p.45).   However,   this   civilian-­elite  
disconnect   is   not   applicable   to   the   Swedish   political   class   as   figure   3   shows  
consistently   high   levels   of   trust   in   both   the   Swedish   government,   and   Swedish  
parliament  in  particular.    
  
Recent  Swedish  attitudes  to  the  European  economy  and  the  euro  are  negative.  Only  
12  percent  of  Swedes  consider  economic  power  an  achievement  of  the  EU,  and  even  
less  (8  percent)  think  that  the  euro  is  a  positive  development  spawned  from  the  EU  
(European   Commission,   2018c,   p.   4).   Figure   2   shows   that   opposition   to   the   euro  
remains   high   today.  A   qualitative  Eurobarometer   survey   provides   another   possible  
insight   into  why  Swedes  oppose  the  euro.  Fears   that  Eurozone  membership  would  
result  in  rising  living  costs  without  rising  salaries  to  follow,  having  to  financially  support  
other   Eurozone   countries   that   are   worse   off,   and   having   less   ability   to   deal   with  
economic  crisis’   (as  also  outlined   in   figure  5)  were  all   reasons   identified  as   to  why  
Swedes   resist   Eurozone  membership   (European   Commission,   2014a,   p.   73).   The  
latest  data  shows  that  62  percent  of  Swedes  think  that  euro  adoption  will  equal  a  loss  
in  economic  control  (European  Commission,  2018a,  p.  37).  The  same  percentage  of  
Swedes  also  believe   that  euro  adoption  will  erode   their  national   identity   (European  





This  chapter  has  touched  on  Swedish  attitudes  to  the  euro  post  the  referendum  on  
euro   adoption,   when   Swedes   were   federo-­sceptic   and   disengaged   with   European  
democracy.   It  showed   that  Swedes  held  negative  perceptions  of   the  EU,  and  were  
weary  of  further  EU-­level  integration.  In  more  recent  times,  Eurobarometer  data  has  
allowed  for  comparisons  of  Swedes  attitudes  to  the  euro,  their  own  institutions  and  EU  
institutions.  This  chapter  has  highlighted   that  opposition   to   the  euro  has  been  high  
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since  it  was  measured  as  part  of  the  standard  Eurobarometer  survey  in  the  last  four  
years,   always   remaining   well   above   50   percent.   Although,   there   was   a   notable  
reduction   in   euro   opposition   most   recently,   possibly   due   to   announced   Eurozone  
reforms.   This   chapter   has   shown   that   Swedes   have   consistently   trusted   their   own  
institutions  (Swedish  government  and  parliament)  above  EU  institutions.  Whilst  most  
recently   there   has   been   an   increase   in   trust   in   the   EU,   the   order   of   trust   has   not  
changed.   Most   trust   is   placed   in   the   Swedish   parliament,   then   the   Swedish  
government,   and   finally   the  EU.   This   chapter   has   identified   the   continuously   large  
disparity  between  the  considerable  majority  of  Swedes  who  perceive  their  economy  to  
be  “good”  and  the  EU-­average,  which  has  never  managed  to  surpass  50  percent  since  
the  measurement  began.  Throughout  the  GFC  (with  the  exception  of  the  second  half  
of  2011  and  the  first  half  of  2014)  Swedes  believed  their  own  government  was  best  
placed  to  deal  with  the  crisis  than  the  EU.  Today  in  Sweden,  nearly  three  quarters  of  
the  population  oppose  the  concept  of  a  United  States  of  Europe  –  remaining  hesitant  
towards  further  integration  just  as  in  post-­2003.  There  exists  a  civilian-­elite  disconnect  
between  Swedes  and  the  EU,  and  this  is  a  cause  for  not  wanting  to  relinquish  more  
political  authority  to  the  EU.  Swedes  still  hold  negative  attitudes  towards  the  EU  as  an  
economic  power,  and   the  euro.  Euro   introduction  brings   fears  amongst  Swedes  of  
rising   living   costs,   stagnant   wage   growth,   support   payments   to   other   Eurozone  
countries,  and  a  loss  of  economic  control.  Finally,  this  chapter  identifies  sovereignty  
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CHAPTER  6:  ECONOMIC  REASONS  
  
Of  the  three  dimensions  of  Swedish  resistance  to  Eurozone  membership  explored  in  
this  thesis,  the  economic  impact  as  a  result  of  Eurozone  membership  is  a  substantive  
one.  It  would  mean  giving  new  authority  to  EU  institutions  via  mechanisms  such  as  
the  SGP  and  burden  sharing.  As  such,  the  economic  conditions  of  Sweden  and  the  
Eurozone   are   interesting   to   compare,   as   they   show   the   results   of   different  
macroeconomic   management   of   both   economies.   This   chapter   looks   at   general  
macroeconomic  indicators  such  as  GDP  per  capita  measured  in  PPS,  unemployment  
rates,   inflation,   debt   and   deficit   levels.   Monetary   indicators   are   also   considered,  
especially  given  that  a  large  economic  shift  as  part  of  Swedish  Eurozone  membership  
would  be  the  loss  of  its  monetary  policy  autonomy  to  the  ECB.  This  chapter  compares  
the   interest   rates   of   the   ECB   and   Riksbank,   whilst   challenging   Reade   and   Volz’s  
(2009)  claim  (in  chapter  2)  of   interest  rate  autonomy.  The  exchange  rate  over   time  
between  the  krona  and  the  euro  is  also  assessed  in  terms  of  fluctuations  and  stability.  
This  chapter  also  looks  at  the  EBU  as  a  part  of  Eurozone  membership,  its  effect  on  
efficiency   and  autonomy   towards  Sweden,   and  uses   the  Nordea  bank   case  as   an  
example  to  illustrate  these  concepts.  Finally,  this  chapter  examines  the  impact  of  the  
Eurozone  debt  crisis  on  Sweden,  and  the  advantages  it  retained  by  being  outside  of  
the  Eurozone  during  this  period  in  economic  history.      
  
  
6.1  General  macroeconomic  indicators  
  
General  macroeconomic   indicators   provide  an  overview  of   economic   performance.  
They  tell  a  story  of  macroeconomic  management  in  two  different  economies.  PPP  can  
be  used  to  make  meaningful  economic  comparisons.  The  OECD  (2016)  defines  PPPs  
as  “the  rates  of  currency  conversion  that  equalize  the  purchasing  power  of  different  
currencies  by  eliminating   the  differences   in  price   levels  between  countries”.  PPS   is  
practically  identical  to  PPP;;  it  is  an  artificial  common  currency  created  by  Eurostat  that  
allows  for  a  genuine  comparison  of  two  different  economies  with  different  currencies.  
  
	   50	  
GDP  can  be  measured  in  PPS  as  opposed  to  different  currencies,  making  it  easier  to  
compare  two  economies.  A  country’s  GDP  per  capita   in  PPS  score   is  presented   in  
relation  to  the  EU-­average  score  of  100.  If  a  country  scores  higher  than  100,  then  its  
GDP  per  person  is  greater  than  the  EU  average.  If  a  country  scores  lower  than  100,  
then  its  GDP  per  person  is  less  than  the  EU  average.  From  this,  the  economic  growth  
of  two  economies  can  be  measured  over  time.  Figure  6  below  measures  the  GDP  per  
capita  in  PPS  of  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone-­average.    
  
Figure  6:  Comparing  the  Eurozone-­average  and  Swedish  GDP  per  capita  in  PPS  from  
2006  to  2017  
	  
Source:  Eurostat,  (2017a).  
*Based  on  latest  available  data.  
	  	  
Both  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone-­average  compare  better  in  terms  of  GDP  per  capita  
in  PPS   than   the  EU-­average   (100).  The  Eurozone-­average  begins  at  109   in  2006,  
slightly  decreasing  to  108  in  2010,  107  in  2012,  and  then  106  in  2017.  Sweden’s  GDP  
per   capita   in  PPS  score   is  higher   than   the  Eurozone-­average;;   staying  consistently  
above  120.  It  reached  a  high  of  128  in  2007,  and  127  in  2008  and  2012.  The  latest  
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data  shows  Sweden’s  score  sitting  at  121.  This  means  that  on  a  per  person  basis,  
Swedes   are,   in   real   terms,   financially   better   off   than   most   individuals   residing   in  
Eurozone   countries.   It   also   means   that   Sweden   has   experienced   more   relative  
economic  growth  (in  terms  of  GDP)  than  the  Eurozone-­average.  If  GDP  per  capita  in  
PPS   is   considerably   higher   for   Sweden   than   the   Eurozone-­average,   and   Sweden  
achieves  this  as  a  Eurozone  outsider,  then  there  is  little  incentive  on  this  basis  to  join  
the  Eurozone.    
	  
High  levels  of  unemployment  are  signs  of  an  unhealthy  economy.  Typically,  low  levels  
of   growth   contribute   to   an   increasing  unemployment   rate   and   vice   versa.  Figure  7  
below  compares  the  levels  on  unemployment  between  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden.  
  
Figure  7:  Comparison  of  unemployment  levels  in  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden  from  2007  
to  2018  
	  
Source:  Eurostat  (2018c).  
*Based  on  latest  available  data.  
**Measured  as  a  percentage  of  the  population  between  ages  20-­64  who  are  not  employed  beyond  
one  working  hour  per  week.  
	  	  
Figure  7  shows  that  Sweden  has  had  consistently  lower  levels  of  unemployment  than  
the  Eurozone  average.  Both   the  Eurozone  and  Sweden   follow  a   similar   pattern   of  
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increasing   unemployment   levels   which   coincide   with   the   onset   of   the   GFC,   then  
decreasing  unemployment  levels  towards  the  end  of  the  crisis.  However,  during  the  
crisis   from  2010  onwards,  Swedish  unemployment  drops  and  stays  near  8  percent  
until   dropping   down   to   6.3   percent   in   2018.   By   contrast,   Eurozone   unemployment  
spikes  during  the  crisis  peaking  at  12  percent  in  2013,  and  decreasing  down  to  8.2  
percent   in  2018.  Both   the  Eurozone  and  Sweden  have   returned  close   to  pre-­crisis  
levels  in  2018.  The  large  disparity  between  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden  during  the  crisis  
(a   4   percent   difference   in   2013)   is   an   indicator   of   how   different   the   economic  
performance  was  in  both  economies.  The  macroeconomic  management  of  Sweden  
with  regards  to  the  effect  on  unemployment  has  been  better  than  in  the  Eurozone,  and  
this  does  not  create  a  compelling  case  for  Sweden  to  then  join  the  Eurozone.  
	  
Inflation  is  an  important  macroeconomic  indicator  to  measure,  because  it  shows  the  
loss  in  value  of  money,  as  well  as  to  what  extent  the  purchasing  power  of  a  currency  
has  weakened.  Figure  8  below  compares  inflation  between  the  krona  and  the  euro.  
  
Figure  8:  Changes  in  inflation  levels  in  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden  from  2007  to  2018  
	  
Source:  Eurostat,  (2018b).  
*Based  on  latest  available  data.  
**Annual  change  in  inflation  measured  as  a  percentage  (-­12  months’  average).  
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Figure  8  does  not  reveal  either  currency  experiencing  significantly  more  inflation  than  
the  other  over  the  given  time  period.  Both  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone  experience  an  
equally   high   level   of   inflation   (3.3   percent)   in   2008.   The   following   year,   the   krona  
inflates  by  1.6  percent  more  than  the  euro.  The  Eurozone  has  greater  inflation  than  
Sweden  from  2011  to  2014  (2.7  percent,  2.5  percent,  1.3  percent,  and  0.4  percent  
respectively),   with   comparatively   higher   levels   of   inflation   in   2011   and   2012   as   a  
consequence  of  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis  that  began  in  2010  and  occurred  throughout  
this   time  period.  From  2015  onwards,  Sweden  experiences  more   inflation   than   the  
Eurozone;;  0.7  percent,  1.1  percent,  1.9  percent,  and  2  percent  respectively.  Figure  8  
does   not   show   significant   disparities   in   inflation   rates   over   a   long   period   of   time  
between   the   Eurozone   or   Sweden.   Inflation   is   reasonably   well   controlled   in   the  
Eurozone,  which  is  consistent  with  the  main  objective  of  the  ECB;;  to  safeguard  the  
euro  against  inflation  (ensure  price  stability)  (European  Central  Bank,  2019).    
	  
Deficit   and   debt   levels   are   a   telling   indicator   of   macroeconomic   management.   A  
governing   body   or   government’s   record   of   revenue   collection,   expenditure,   and  
borrowing  are   the  cornerstone  principles  of   financial  macroeconomic  management.  
These   present   themselves   in   the   form   of   debt   and   deficit   levels.   Therefore,   it   is  
interesting   to   compare   the  Eurozone  deficit   and  debt   levels  with   that  of  Sweden's.  
Figure   9   below   compares   the   deficits   of   the   Eurozone   and   Sweden   across   time,  
encompassing  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis.  
  
Figure  9:  Comparison  of  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden’s  deficits  as  a  percentage  of  
GDP  from  2006  to  2017  
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Source:  Eurostat,  (2017c).  
*Deficit  defined  as  net  lending/net  borrow.  
**Percentages  below  0  (-­)  equates  to  a  deficit,  above  0  equates  to  a  surplus.  
***Based  on  latest  available  data.  
 
Figure  9  shows  that  the  Eurozone  has  not  been  able  to  achieve  a  fiscal  surplus  in  the  
last  12  years   from  2006  to  2018,  and  has  constantly  remained   in  deficit,  with   large  
deficits   in  2009  and  2010  of  6.2  percent  of  GDP  (during   the  Eurozone  debt  crisis).  
Sweden  begins  with  a  healthy  surplus  peaking  at  3.4  percent  of  GDP  in  2007,  then  
goes  into  deficit  in  2009  and  does  not  return  to  surplus  until  2015  (0.2  percent  of  GDP).  
However,  whilst  Sweden  is  in  deficit,  their  deficit  levels  remain  considerably  lower  than  
that  of  the  Eurozone’s.  The  Eurozone  deficit  has  been  steadily  shrinking  since  2011  
until  present,  but  they  are  yet  to  achieve  a  surplus.  Sweden  has  had  a  growing  surplus  
since  2015  onwards.    
  
Figure  10  below  compares   the   levels  as  debt   (measured  as  a  percentage  of  GDP)  
between  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden.  
  
Figure  10:  Comparison  of  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden’s  Debt  to  GDP  levels  from  
2004  to  2017    
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Source:  Eurostat,  (2017b).    
*Based  on  latest  available  data.  
	  
Figure   10   shows   a   large   disparity   between   Eurozone   and   Swedish   debt   levels;;  
Sweden  has  always  had  substantially  less  debt.  Eurozone  debt  increases  rapidly  from  
2008   (as   per   the   onset   of   the   GFC),   whilst   Sweden’s   is   relatively   unaffected   and  
increased  to  41.3  percent  of  GDP  in  2009,  then  decreased.  Eurozone  debt  levels  peak  
at  91.8  percent  of  GDP  in  2014,  and  have  decreased  to  89.1  percent  of  GDP  today.  
By  comparison,  Sweden’s  debt  presently  sits  at  42.4  percent  of  GDP.  The  difference  
in  debt  levels  between  the  Eurozone  and  Sweden  in  2004  and  in  2017  tell  two  different  
macroeconomic   stories.   In   2004,   the   gap   between   the   Eurozone   debt   level   and  
Sweden’s  was   19.6   percent   of  GDP   (68.5   percent   and   48.9   percent   respectively).  
Today,  that  gap  is  now  46.7  percent.  With  high  debt  levels  in  the  Eurozone,  it  remains  
exposed  to  future  economic  shocks.  Sweden  is  comparatively  less  vulnerable  due  to  
its  lower  debt  levels.  The  Eurozone  and  Sweden,  throughout  the  GFC,  have  had  their  
debt  levels  influenced  by  factors  such  as  Sweden’s  high  tax  collection  rate,  and  the  
Eurozone’s  Mediterranean  members  who  were  badly  affected  by  the  GFC.  Just  like  
the  deficit   levels,  Sweden  has   fared  considerably  better   than   the  Eurozone.  These  
quantitative  comparisons  suggest  there  is  poor  macroeconomic  management  within  
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the  Eurozone  –  hardly  a  compelling  case  for  Sweden  to  join  such  an  economic  and  
monetary  union.    
  
  
6.2  Monetary  indicators  
  
In  chapter  2,  a  claim  was  made  by  Reade  and  Volz  (2009)  that  interest  rates  set  by  
the  Riksbank  mimicked   interest   rates  set  by   the  ECB,  albeit  by   following   them  100  
days  behind.  It  is  worth  considering  that  Reade  and  Volz  (2009)  made  this  claim  prior  
to  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis.  Gabrisch  (2017)  goes  further  than  Reade  and  Volz  (2009)  
in  chapter  2,  by  making  the  claim  that  if  Sweden  were  to  join  the  Eurozone  they  would  
get  greater  control  over  their  interest  rates  as  they  would  have  a  voice  within  the  ECB  
on  what  these  rates  would  be  set  at.  Figure  11  below  compares  interest  rates  from  the  
ECB  and  Riksbank  from  2010  onwards.  
    
Figure  11:  Comparison  of  ECB  and  Riksbank  Interest  Rates  from  2010  to  2018    
	  
	  	  
Source:  Riksbank  (2018)  and  European  Central  Bank  (2018a).  
*Q1  indicates  the  first  quarter  of  the  year,  Q2  indicates  the  second  quarter  of  the  year,  Q3  indicates  
the  third  quarter  of  the  year,  Q4  indicates  the  fourth  quarter  of  the  year.  
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By  looking  at  the  quarter  where  the  ECB  interest  rate  changes  then  seeing  if   in  the  
following  quarter  the  Riksbank  follows  suite,  it  is  possible  to  see  if  Reade  and  Volz’s  
(2009)  claim  is  applicable  in  recent  times.  From  the  third  quarter  of  2010  to  the  first  
quarter   of   2011   the   ECB   interest   rate   remains   consistent   at   1   percent,   whilst   the  
Riksbank   interest   rate   increases   from   0.25   percent   to   1.37   percent   –   clearly   not  
mimicking  the  exact  interest  rate  of  the  ECB  nor  the  direction  of  rate  change.  In  the  
fourth  quarter  of  2011,  the  Riksbank  interest  rate  is  set  at  1.97  percent  whilst  the  ECB  
rate  is  1  percent.  Again,  a  considerable  difference  in  interest  rates.  Following  this,  the  
Riksbank  decreases  its   interest  rate  over  the  next  two  quarters  whilst  the  ECB  rate  
does  not  change.  From  the  first  quarter  of  2013  to  the  second  quarter  of  2014  both  
interest  rates  fall,  however,  the  ECB  rate  falls  faster  than  the  Riksbank.  Not  once  are  
the  rates  similar  during   this  period.  From  the  second  quarter  of  2014  until   the   third  
quarter   of   2015,   the   Riksbank   interest   rate   falls   significantly   whilst   the   ECB   rate  
decreases  slightly  and  plateaus  at  0.05  percent.  Since  the  second  quarter  of  2016,  the  
Riksbank  and  ECB  have  consistently  maintained  a  0.5  percent  difference.  As  shown  
by   figure   11,   the   Riksbank   interest   rate   does   not   strictly   follow   the   exact   rate   nor  
direction  of  rate  change  of  the  ECB.  Gabrisch’s  (2017)  claim  of  Sweden  having  greater  
control  over  its  interest  rates  should  it  be  a  member  of  the  Eurozone  was  based  on  
this  phenomenon.  Therefore,  given  what  figure  11  displays,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  
Eurozone  membership  would  give  Sweden  more  control  over  their  interest  rates.    
	  	  
The   idea   of   a   loss   in   economic   control   concerns  Swedes   (European  Commission,  
2018a,   p.   37).   Sweden   likes   the   retention   of   autonomy   over   its   interest   rates   by  
remaining  out  of  the  Eurozone.  However,  this  comes  at  a  cost.  Investment  in  the  euro  
has  become  an  unattractive  prospect  since  the  2012  debt  crisis,  and  as  Sweden  is  a  
Eurozone  outsider,  it  has  caused  deflation  in  Sweden  coupled  with  a  high  value  krona  
(Stratfor  Analysis,  2015).  Sweden  has  had  traditionally  high  interest  rates  (as  seen  in  
figure  11  pre-­2015),  exacerbating  the  effects  of  deflation.  To  combat  this,  the  Riksbank  
has  reduced  interest  rates  to  as  low  as  -­0.5  percent   in  the  second  quarter  of  2016.  
However,  the  ECB  has  also  reduced  interest  rates  at  the  same  time,  making  this  an  
ineffective  policy  resolution  for  the  Swedish  economy  (Stratfor  Analysis,  2015).  As  a  
result  of  these  negative  interest  rates,  risk  lenders  are  keeping  money  in  physical  form  
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so   as   to   avoid   paying   to   put  money   into   a   bank2   (Stratfor   analysis,   2015).   Banks  
subsequently   have   less   credit   as   a   consequence   of   this.   Negative   interest   rates  
provide  cheap  credit  for  investors,  which  when  taken  advantage  of  can  create  asset  
bubbles,   with   housing   being   an   example   of   this   (Stratfor   Analysis,   2015).   This   is  
positive  for  investors  in  the  short-­term,  however  longer-­term  citizens  are  locked  out  of  
the  housing  market  as  housing  prices  quickly  rise.  Testimony  to  this  is  the  fact  that  
Swedish  home  ownership   rates  are  some  of   the   lowest   in   the  EU   (65.2  percent   in  
2017)  (Statista,  2019).    
  
Exchange   rate   comparisons   are   important   as   they   highlight   the   general   monetary  
conditions  and  changes   in  different  economies.  Figure  12   looks  at   the  value  of   the  
krona   in  relation  to  the  euro.  Sweden  has  had  a  floating  exchange  rate  since  1992  
(Riksbank,  2019a).  Exchange  rates  have  significant  consequences.  They  determine  
the  cost  of  imports,  competitiveness  of  exports,  and  affect  (in  this  case)  Swedes  ability  
to  buy,  shop,  and  sell  within  the  Eurozone.  The  value  of  a  currency  is  also  seen  as  a  
symbol  of  strength,  as  was  outlined  by  Hobolt  and  Leblond  (2009,  p.  203)  in  chapter  
2.  	    
	  	  
Figure  12:  Exchange  rate  of  Swedish  krona  versus  the  euro  from  2007  to  2018  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Risk  Lenders  are  anyone  who  deposits  money  into  a  bank,  as  they  are  in  effect  loaning  money  to  the  
bank  who  typically  reward  them  with  credit  in  the  form  of  interest  payments.  
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Source:  Eurostat,  (2018a).  
*Based  on  12-­month  annual  average.  
**Based  on  latest  available  data.  
***Measured  as  value  of  krona  equal  to  1  euro.  
	  	  
Swedish  interest  rates  have  been  (figure  11  shows  the  Riksbank  interest  rate  at  -­0.5  
percent  from  the  second  quarter  of  2016)  correlating  with  a  fall  in  value  of  the  krona  to  
the   euro   (which   sat   at   10.258   krona   to   the   euro   in   2018).   The   value   of   the   krona  
increased   from  2010   to   2013   (8.652   krona   to   the   euro)   at   the   same  period  where  
interest  rates  were  high  (topping  1.98  percent  in  2011)  then  steadily  declined.  Looking  
at  figure  11  and  figure  12,  it  shows  a  positive  correlation  between  interest  rates  and  
the  exchange  rate.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  rise  in  value  of  the  krona  over  
this  time  against  the  euro  would  also  have  been  impacted  by  a  falling  euro  due  to  the  
Eurozone  debt  crisis.  Over  a  12-­year  period   the  krona  has  remained  stable,  with  a  
fluctuation  difference  never  exceeding  1.61  krona.    Figure  12  has  shown  that  Sweden  
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6.3  European  Banking  Union:  efficiency,  autonomy,  and  the  Nordea  case  
	  	  	  
The  EBU  is  based  on  the  single  rulebook,  which  is  designed  so  that  all  states  that  are  
a   part   of   the   EBU   have   a   consistent   regulatory   landscape   regarding   financial  
institutions  (European  Commission,  2018d).  EBU  members  decide  on  the  rules  that  
make   up   the   single   rulebook,   which   is   applicable   to   the   8300   financial   institutions  
across   EBU   states   (European  Council,   2017).   Consistent   cross-­border   regulations  
facilitate  greater  efficiency  and  more  equal  competition  amongst  financial  institutions  
within  the  EBU.  
    
Spendzharova  and  Bayram  (2016,  p.  566)  states;;  "Sweden  turns  its  back  on  efficiency  
gains  because  it  does  not  want  to  join  the  EBU  as  it  does  not  want  to  pay  for  other  
failed   banks   through   recapitalization   –   a   concern   also   shared   with   Denmark".  
However,  this  somewhat  contradicts  a  statement  issued  by  the  Government  Offices  of  
Sweden   (2016)   which   says:   “It   is   essential   for   Sweden   that   the   euro   area   works  
efficiently  and  is  stable…The  Government's  objective  is  to  help  all  Member  States  take  
their   responsibility   and   take  necessary  measures   to  ensure  national   public   finance  
stability   and   sustainability…   Everyone   bears   a   responsibility   for   our   shared  
development”.   Nevertheless,   the   fact   is   that   the   Swedish   government   takes   great  
interest  in  the  efficiency  of  the  euro  area,  yet  does  not  want  to  gain  efficiency  from  it,  
and  as  was  in  the  case  of  Nordea  (see  below),  competes  against  it.  Furthermore,  the  
argument  of  collective  stability   for  shared  development   is   remarkably  similar   to   the  
notion  of  burden-­sharing  that  is  part  of  EBU  membership.  Either  Spendzharova  and  
Bayram  (2016)  are  not  convincing  in  claiming  Sweden  does  not  want  to  pay  for  the  
recapitalization  of  banks  in  crisis,  or  the  statement  issued  by  the  Swedish  government  
in  2016  were  hollow  diplomatic  words.  It  is  likely  that  the  latter  is  the  case,  given  the  
fact   that  Sweden  remains  reluctant   towards  having  any  financial  obligation   towards  
the  Eurozone  (as  discussed  in  chapter  4  vis-­à-­vis  handing  over  financial  autonomy  to  
the  Eurozone  and  the  subsequent  effect  on  the  Swedish  welfare  state).    
      
Being  an  EBU  outsider  can  entail  negative  implications.  Nordea  bank’s  relocation  from  
Stockholm   to   Helsinki   is   an   example   of   this.   Nordea   relocated   to   Finland   in   part  
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because  it   is  part  of  the  EBU3.  Greater  political  stability  within  the  EBU  and  a  more  
equal   regulatory   environment   for   competing   against   other   European   banks   were  
Nordea’s  reasons  for  relocation  (Johnson  and  Ahlander,  2017).    
  
Those  advocating  for  Eurozone  and  EBU  membership  may  use  the  Nordea  case  as  
an  example   for  why  Swedish  accession   into   the  Eurozone  and  EBU   is  necessary.  
Finland’s   EBU   status   may   have   prompted   Nordea   to   relocate   out   of   Sweden   to  
Helsinki,  but  other  reasons  for  Nordea’s  relocation  should  be  considered  as  well.  At  
the  time  of  Nordea’s  relocation,   the  Social  Democrats  (the  then-­governing  Swedish  
political  party)  were  considering  increasing  taxes  on  financial  institutions  in  Sweden  
(Johnson  and  Ahlander,  2017).  Should  Nordea  have  stayed  in  Sweden,  a  200-­million-­
euro  fee  increase  for  2018  would  have  been  applied,  followed  by  another  150-­million-­
euro  increase  in  2019  (Milne,  2017).  Swedish  regulations  are  renowned  as  some  of  
the  toughest  in  Europe,  and  by  moving  to  Helsinki  Nordea  could  free  up  6  billion  euros  
in  capital  as  well  as  boost  its  profits  by  350  million  euros  per  annum  (Milne,  2017).  It  
is  clear  that  profit  is  a  large  motivator  for  Nordea’s  relocation.  Its  relocation  is  equally  
about   regulation  dodging  and  profit  maximization  as   it   is   about   gaining   stability   by  
being  in  the  EBU.  
   
Whilst  EBU  membership  would  create  a  more  stable  political  environment  for  banking  
institutions,  non-­Eurozone  countries  have  no  voting  power  or  voice  for  EBU  stances,  
as  they  do  not  have  a  voice  within  the  ECB  (Dauschy,  2017).  Were  Sweden  to  join  the  
EBU,  it  would  result   in  a  loss  of  Swedish  control  over  banking  institutions,  meaning  
tough   financial   regulations  would  no   longer  be  able   to  be   imposed  by   the  Swedish  
government.  Finally,   supervising  8300  banks  across   the  EU  may   result   in   ill-­suited  
regulations  for  some  countries  and  institutions  whilst  being  well-­suited  to  others.    
    
  
6.4  The  Eurozone  debt  crisis  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3    When  countries  ascend  into  the  Eurozone,  they  automatically  become  members  of  the  EBU,  as  is  
the  case  with  Finland.      
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The   Eurozone   debt   crisis   is   a   contributing   economic   factor   for   Swedish   Eurozone  
rejection.  The  crisis  highlighted  the  issue  of  contagion  effects  within  an  economic  and  
monetary  union,  flaws  in  the  political  and  economic  framework  of  the  Eurozone,  and  
left  a  destructive  aftermath  which  still  has  implications  today.    
  
The  Eurozone  debt  crisis  demonstrated  the  rapid  and  damaging  effect  contagion4  has  
on  countries  within  an  economic  and  monetary  union  (Frieden  and  Walter,  2017,  p.  5).  
As   Eurozone-­outsider   countries   like   Sweden   were   not   interconnected   through   the  
same  framework  as  Eurozone  countries,  they  experienced  less  contagion  effects  and  
could   design   their   own   monetary   policy   to   counteract   these   effects   (Frieden   and  
Walter,  2017,  p.  6).  Figures  7,  9,  and  10  (unemployment   rates,  deficit,  and  debt   to  
GDP   levels   respectively)   highlight   the   consequence   of  monetary   independence   to  
counteract  contagion.  They  show  disparity  between  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone  with  
Sweden  performing  better   throughout   the  Eurozone  debt  crisis   in  all   instances  with  
respect  to  the  aforementioned  figures.  Economic  booms  and  busts  occur  at  a  national  
level,   and  are  difficult   to   converge  within   the  Eurozone  when  a  common  monetary  
policy  is  the  only  instrument  available  (De  Grauwe,  2016,  p.  151).  Sweden’s  monetary  
independence  means  that  managing  booms  and  busts  during  the  crisis  was  not  an  
economic   challenge   they   faced.   The   susceptibility   to   contagion   as   a   result   of  
interconnectedness  meant  that  during  the  crisis  there  was  an  expectation  for  burden  
sharing  through  bailouts  as  a  form  of  crisis  management  (Frieden  and  Walter,  2017,  
p.  5).  Should  Sweden  have  been  a  member  of  the  Eurozone,  then  its  fears  of  burden  
sharing  and  recapitalization  of  banks  would  have  become  a  reality.    
  
Such  bailouts  have  resulted  in  the  Eurozone  experiencing  a  lack  of  solidarity  within  its  
economic  and  monetary  union.  Inter-­union  resentment  as  a  result  of  seemingly  unfair  
bailout  conditions  between  the  creditor  and  debtor,  e.g.  Germany  and  Greece,  have  
fostered  this  (Reese  and  Lauenstein,  2014,  p.  162).  Reese  and  Lauenstein  (2014,  p.  
163)  uses  the  term  “negative  interdependence”  to  describe  this  relationship  between  
the   gain   of   one   country   within   the   Eurozone   at   the   expense   of   another.   Sweden  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Referring  to  contagion  in  an  economic  sense,  Edwards  (2000,  p.  880)  defines  it  as  “a  situation  where  
the  extent  and  magnitude  of  the  international  transmission  of  shocks  exceeds  what  was  expected  by  
market  participants”.  
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forgoes   the   ‘north  vs  south’,   ‘creditor  vs  debtor’  contention  by   remaining  out  of   the  
Eurozone.    
  
Divisions  within  the  Eurozone  do  not  stop  at  the  creditor-­debtor  relationship;;  but  are  
also  found  in  differing  opinions  on  what  reforms  of  the  Eurozone  should  be  undertaken  
in  the  post-­crisis  environment.  The  Eurozone  is  divided  between  those  countries  which  
favour   fiscal   transfer  reforms,  such  as  France  and  Greece,  and  those  which  favour  
fiscal   discipline,   such   as   the  Netherlands   or  Germany5   (Lehner   and  Wasserfallen,  
2019,  p.  54).  Lehner  and  Wasserfallen  (2019,  p.  54)  show  that  Sweden,  although  a  
Eurozone-­outsider,  errs  on  the  side  of  fiscal  discipline.  The  fiscal  transfer-­style  reforms  
which  some  Eurozone  countries  are  advocating  for  are  the  same  type  of  reforms  that  
would  threaten  the  Swedish  welfare  system,  as  referred  to  in  chapter  4.  Even  today  
without   reforms,   Eurozone  membership   entails   the   potential   for   fiscal   policy   to   be  
heavily  influenced  by  the  EU.  The  SGP  can  be  used  by  the  European  Commission  to  
force   Eurozone   countries   to   alter   tax   rates   or   government   expenditure   levels   (De  
Grauwe,  2016,  p.  154).    
  
De  Grauwe  (2016,  p.  153)  argues  that  the  Eurozone  recovery  plan  will  not  suffice  long-­
term  as  it  is  a  liquidity  trap.  Quantitative  easing  (when  coupled  with  low  interest  rates  
such  as  the  current  ECB  rate  of  0.05  percent)  is  ineffective  at  stimulating  economic  
growth   because   the   liquidity   does   not   find   its   way   into   the   real   economy;;   rather,  
financial  institutions  keep  the  liquidity  without  investing  it  into  productive  areas  as  they  
are  limited  for  a  good  return  in  such  an  economic  climate  (De  Grauwe,  2016,  p.  153).  
If  De  Grauwe’s  economic  assessment  of  the  Eurozone  recovery  plan  is  correct,  then  
Sweden  will  have  avoided  an  ineffective  monetary  policy  resolution  to  the  debt  crisis  
by  remaining  out  of  the  Eurozone.    
  
Developments  within  the  Eurozone  in  the  present  day  also  present  a  concern  to  the  
economic  future  of  the  Eurozone.  Italy,  with  a  populist  government  that  neglects  fiscal  
constraints  laid  out  in  the  SGP,  has  unsustainable  levels  of  government  debt  which  
poses   a   risk   of   a   second   crisis   (Politico,   2018).   As   well   as   this,   banks   within   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5   Fiscal   transfer   reforms   refer   to   greater   fiscal   equilibrium   within   the   Eurozone,   including   the  
establishment   of   initiatives   such   as   a  Eurozone-­wide   unemployment   scheme,   a   common  Eurozone  
budget,  and  Eurozone  taxes.  
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Eurozone  are  experiencing  low  levels  of  profitability  (due  to  non-­profitable  loans  and  
low  ECB  interest  rates),  and  are  exposing  themselves  to  increased  risk  by  reducing  
credit  standards  for  borrowers  (Politico,  2018).  Finally,  there  remains  an  unaddressed  
fiscal  imbalance  between  northern  and  southern  Europe  (Politico,  2018).  Whilst  these  
developments  do  not  signal  the  immediate  onset  of  an  economic  downturn,  they  are  
nonetheless  concerning.      
  
The  Eurozone  debt   crisis   has  demonstrated   the  weaknesses  of   the  economic  and  
monetary  union,  and  the  level  of  contention  within   it.  The  crisis  has,   in  many  ways,  





General   macroeconomic   indicators   have   provided   an   insightful   comparison   of   the  
Swedish   and   Eurozone   economies.   Sweden   has   fared   better   in   most   of   the  
comparisons.  When  comparing  GDP  per  capita  in  PPS,  Sweden  has  had  consistently  
greater  purchasing  power  and  GDP  growth  than  the  Eurozone.  Unemployment  levels  
in  Sweden  have  remained  consistently  lower  than  the  levels  of  unemployment  in  the  
Eurozone.  Regarding  inflation,  there  was  no  significant  differences  between  the  krona  
and  the  euro;;  both  are  reasonably  well  controlled  by  their  respective  central  banks.  
Sweden  has  considerably  lower  levels  of  debt  and  deficit  than  the  Eurozone,  although  
it  should  be  acknowledged  that  other  factors  such  as  the  Swedish  tax  collection  rate  
and   the   economic   performance   of   the  Eurozone’s  Mediterranean  members   (which  
influence  the  Eurozone-­average  data)  would  have  impacted  on  these  statistics.  These  
general   macroeconomic   indicators   show   that   asides   from   inflation   (where   neither  
Sweden  nor   the  Eurozone  outperformed   the  other),  Sweden  has  consistently   fared  
better   than   the   Eurozone.   This   does   not   make   a   compelling   case   for   Eurozone  
membership.  With  regard  to  monetary  indicators,  interest  rates  and  the  exchange  rate  
between  the  krona  and  the  euro  were  investigated  with  telling  conclusions  reached  for  
both.  The  comparison  of   interest   rates  over   time  highlighted   that  whilst   the  overall  
direction  and  level  of  rates  were  similar  between  the  Riksbank  and  the  ECB,  they  are  
not  exactly  the  same.  Therefore,  Sweden  would  not  gain  greater  control  over  interest  
rates   by   joining   the  Eurozone.  However,   Sweden   has   experienced   some   negative  
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economic  side  effects  as  a  result  of  its  monetary  policy.  The  exchange  rate  between  
the  two  currencies  has  remained  stable  and  floated  without  significant  tension  for  the  
last   11   years,   showing   that   Sweden   can   exist   outside   of   the   Eurozone   and   have  
exchange  rate  stability.  EBU  membership  showed  the  potential  of  increasing  efficiency  
and  stability,  however,   there   is  an  argument  autonomy   loss.  The  disadvantages   to  
staying  out  of  the  EBU  were  showcased  by  Nordea’s  relocation  to  Helsinki  in  search  
of   greater   political   stability.   However,   the   impact   of   profits   by   relocating   was   also  
acknowledged  as  a  factor  in  relocation.  The  Eurozone  crisis  showed  the  effect  it  has  
at  reinforcing  Sweden’s  resistance  of  Eurozone  membership.  It  revealed  that  Sweden  
mitigates  contagion  by  staying  out  of  the  Eurozone.  Swedish  fears  of  burden  sharing  
may  have  become  a  reality  for  Sweden  had  it  been  a  member  of  the  Eurozone  during  
the  crisis.  Mechanisms  such  as  a  the  SGP  show  how  the  European  Commission  would  
have  had  the  authority  to  control  elements  of  Sweden’s  fiscal  policy  should  it  be  a  part  
of   the  Eurozone.  This  crisis  has  demonstrated   the  constraints  within   the  Eurozone.  
Notably,  the  ‘creditor  vs  debtor’  relationship  between  Eurozone  countries  and  differing  
views  on  Eurozone  reform.  One  such   type  of   reform,   fiscal   transfer,  could  have  an  
impact  on  Sweden  with  regard  to  its  fears  of  damaging  or  altering  its  welfare  system,  
should  it  be  a  Eurozone  member.  Finally,  it  was  witnessed  that  there  are  concerning  
economic  developments  within   the  Eurozone   today,  and   that  a   stable   future   is  not  
certain.  Overall,  based  on  quantitative  macroeconomic  comparison,  there  is  a  lack  of  
incentive  for  Sweden  to  join  the  Eurozone  as  it  outperforms  the  Eurozone  in  all  almost  
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CHAPTER  7:  DISCUSSION  AND  CONCLUSION  
  
This  chapter  will  discuss  the  answers  to  the  research  questions  that  were  outlined  at  
the  beginning  of  this  thesis  by  looking  at  the  findings  given  in  the  previous  chapters.  
To  recap,  the  main  research  question  of  this  thesis  asks:  what  are  the  political  and  
socioeconomic  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone?  This  is  broken  
down  into  three  sub-­questions:  
  
•   What  are  the  political  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone?  
•   What  are  the  social  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone?  
•   What  are  the  economic  reasons  for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone?  
  
This  chapter  will  recapitulate  and  conceptualize  the  findings  of  previous  chapters  and  
will  then  conclude  the  thesis  by  drawing  the  main  conclusions  from  each  chapter  within  
this   thesis.  Finally,   this  chapter  will  critically  evaluate   this   thesis  by  highlighting   the  
limitations  of  the  study  and  outlining  opportunities  for  further  study  within  this  field.    
  
  
7.1  Recapitulation  and  conceptualization  of  findings    
  
In  chapter  1,  the  context  of  the  investigation  was  provided,  the  main  research  question  
and   sub-­questions   were   formulated,   and   the   structure   of   this   thesis   laid   out.   The  
methodology   was   explained,   with   validity   concerns   and   delimitations   addressed.  
Definitions  for  key  terms  employed  in  this  thesis  were  also  given.  Chapter  2  gave  a  
review  of   the   relevant   literature   relating   to  Sweden’s   resistance   towards  Eurozone  
membership.  The  literature  provided  an  overview  of  the  2003  Swedish  referendum  on  
Eurozone  membership,  Sweden  and  its  manipulation  of  the  convergence  criteria  vis-­
à-­vis  ERM  II,  as  well  as  post-­referendum  literature  pertaining  to  the  topic.  Chapter  3  
outlined   the   multi-­faceted   theoretical   framework   for   this   thesis,   using   realism,  
rationalism,  and  constructivism.  The  chapter  defined  these  theories,  exemplified  them  
in   context   using   examples   from   the   previous   chapter,   and   explained  how  all   three  
theories  could  work  in  conjunction  with  one  another.  In  chapter  4,  the  political  reasons  
for  Sweden’s  resistance  to  join  the  Eurozone  were  looked  at.  The  chapter  analysed  
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the  stances  on  Eurozone  membership  amongst  the  eight  political  parties  sitting  in  the  
Riksdag,   of   which   all   but   one   (The   Liberals)   were   against   euro   adoption.   Political  
parties’  main  concerns  were  loss  of  sovereignty  and  economic  concerns.  The  chapter  
made   a   comparison   of   general   election   results   from   2014   and   2018,   showing   an  
increase  in  the  Eurosceptic  vote.  The  popularity  of  the  Swedish  welfare  system  and  
politician’s  reluctance  to  place  its  funding  in  jeopardy  by  joining  the  Eurozone  (as  they  
would   risk   losing   political   capital)   was   noted.   Finally,   the   chapter   explained   how  
Sweden   did   not   participate   in   ERM   II,   thus   remaining   out   of   the   Eurozone   by   not  
satisfying  the  convergence  criteria  as  laid  out  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  TFEU.  
Chapter  5  revealed  Sweden  as  a  federo-­sceptic  country.  It  was  shown  that  the  majority  
of  Swedes  have  a  negative  attitude  towards  the  Eurozone.  Swedes  have  a  distrust  in  
European  elites,  and  trust  their  own  government  institutions  over  EU  ones.  It  was  also  
noted   that  Swedes  were  concerned  about   the  erosion  of   their  national   identity  with  
increasing  EU-­level  integration.  Chapter  6  highlighted  how  the  Swedish  economy  has  
outperformed  that  of  the  Eurozone’s  in  almost  every  regard.    
  
Sweden   avoids   Eurozone   membership   by   not   participating   in   ERM   II,   thus   not  
satisfying   the  convergence  criteria   for  euro  accession  as   laid  out   in   the  Maastricht  
Treaty  and  TFEU.    
  
The  Swedish  political  landscape  is  overwhelmingly  anti-­euro,  with  only  The  Liberals  
advocating  for  Eurozone  membership.  The  reasons  cited  in  Swedish  political  parties’  
manifestos   for  an  anti-­euro  stance  can  be  broken  down   into   two  main   themes:   the  
economic  conditions  within  the  Eurozone  (notably  debt  levels,  unemployment  rates,  
and  economic  bubbles),  and  fears  of  sovereignty   loss.  Swedish  political  parties  are  
behaving   in   both   a   rationalist   and   realist  manner   regarding   their   reasons   for   euro  
opposition.  Resisting  Eurozone  membership  on   the  basis  of   economic   concerns   is  
acting   in  a   rationalist  manner,  as   it   is   logical   to  avoid  membership  of  an  economic  
union  that  is  plagued  with  economic  woes.  Opposing  integration  due  to  sovereignty  
concerns   is  a  display  of   realism,  as  opposition   to  anything  which  detracts   from   the  
nation-­state  is  a  realist  principle.    
  
Comparing   the   Swedish   general   election   results   of   2014   against   2018   revealed  
growing  Euroscepticism  and  a  lack  of  desire  for  EU-­level  integration,  reflected  in  the  
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form  of  a  significant  increase  in  vote  share  for  the  Sweden  Democrats  (Sweden’s  right-­
wing   Eurosceptic   political   party).   As   Sweden’s   only   party   within   the   Riksdag  
advocating  for  Eurozone  membership,  The  Liberals  vote  share  did  not  change  (they  
remained   with   the   second   smallest   vote   share   in   the   Riksdag).   This   is   perhaps  
because  Sweden  is  a  federo-­sceptic  country,  and  weary  of  concepts  such  as  a  “United  
States  of  Europe”  that  would  see  the  federalization  of  Europe  (European  Commission,  
2014c,  p.  87).  In  this  way,  Sweden  is  quite  realist,  as  deeper  institutional  integration  is  
not  something  that  resonates  with  Swedes.    
  
Swedes  are  disconnected  with  “European  elites”,  but  seemingly  not  their  own  elites.  
Figure  3  shows  that   institutional   trust  has  always  remained   in  order  of   the  Riksdag  
first,  the  Swedish  government  second,  and  EU  institutions  last.    
	  	  
The  majority  of  Swedes  believe  that  Eurozone  membership  will  erode  their  national  
identity   (European   Commission,   2018a,   p.   39).   Constructivism   provides   an  
understanding  of  this,  as  it  describes  actors  as  having  an  identity,  and  acting  in  a  way  
to  protect  that  identity.  By  staying  out  of  the  Eurozone,  Swedes  believe  that  they  are  
protecting  their  national  identity.    
  
The  Swedish  welfare  system  is  revered,  and  Eurozone  membership  places  its  long-­
term  funding  security  at  risk  with  further  Eurozone  integration,  particularly  at  a  fiscal  
level  (as  per  the  fiscal  transfer  reforms  and  the  SGP  discussed  in  chapter  6).  Swedish  
politicians  are   rationalist   actors.  They  act   in  a   logical  manner,  not   jeopardizing   the  
funding  structure  of   the  Swedish  welfare  system   through  Eurozone  membership   to  
avoid  losing  their  political  capital.  
  
Economically,  Sweden  outperforms  the  Eurozone  in  almost  every  way  (the  exception  
being   inflation,   where   neither   economy   experienced   unhealthy   levels   of   inflation).  
Sweden  has  had  a  consistently  higher  PPP  (figure  6),  and  comparatively  lower  levels  
of   unemployment.   Figure   7   showed   large   disparities   in   the   level   of   unemployment  
between  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone,  with  the  gap  widening  considerably  with  the  onset  
of   the  Eurozone  debt  crisis.   In   the   last  12  years,   the  Eurozone  has  been  unable  to  
achieve  a  fiscal  surplus  (it  has  constantly  remained  in  deficit),  whilst  Sweden  only  went  
into  deficit  in  2007  and  returned  to  surplus  in  2015  (shown  in  figure  9).  The  difference  
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in  the  debt  levels  between  Sweden  and  the  Eurozone  are  also  considerably  large  (with  
Sweden   having   comparatively   less   debt   than   the   Eurozone),   and   the   difference  
between  the  two  only  widening  with  the  onset  of  the  GFC  (as  per  figure  10).  Whilst  
being  outside  of  the  Eurozone,  the  Swedish  krona  has  floated  freely  and  with  stability  
(as   displayed   in   figure   12).   Therefore,   gaining   exchange   rate   stability   is   not   a  
particularly  valid  argument  for  Sweden  to  join  the  Eurozone.    
  
What  this  data  shows,  is  that  there  is  little  to  no  incentive  (in  an  economic  sense)  for  
Sweden   to   join   the   Eurozone.   Further   than   this,   it   also   shows   poor   economic  
management  on  behalf  of  the  Eurozone.  This  is  perhaps  why,  in  figure  5,  in  all  but  two  
instances  Swedes  have  always  favoured  their  own  government  to  manage  the  GFC  
over   EU   institutions.   It   also   explains   the   massive   disparity   displayed   in   figure   4  
between   the   number   of   Swedes   and   EU   citizens   who   perceive   their   economy   as  
“good”  (88  percent  of  Swedes  compared  with  49  percent  of  EU  citizens  –  the  majority  
of  whom  are  Eurozone  citizens).  Swedes  have  strong  concerns  about  the  economic  
impact  that  Eurozone  membership  would  have  on  Sweden,  particularly  regarding  the  
current  economic  health  of  the  Eurozone  economy,  the  potential  impact  of  decreasing  
salaries,  rising  commodity  prices,  and  having  to  bail  out  other  countries  and  financial  
institutions  within  the  Eurozone.    
  
Rationalism   largely   explains   Sweden’s   behaviour   when   rejecting   Eurozone  
membership   on   economic   grounds.   If   Sweden   is   seeking   to   maintain   or   increase  
favourable  economic  conditions,  the  economic  contrast  between  its  own  economy  and  
that  of  the  Eurozone’s  over  the  last  12  years  provides  an  adequate  reason  not  to  wish  
to  become  part  of  the  Eurozone.  As  has  been  demonstrated,  recent  history  shows  that  
Sweden  has  outperformed  the  Eurozone  economically,  and  as  such,  it  is  rational  to  
expect  that  Swedes  would  not  join  an  economic  union  which  they  have  outperformed.  	  
  
This  thesis  highlighted,  in  chapter  6,  that  Swedish  interest  rates  set  by  the  Riksbank  
do   not   follow,   in   an   exact  manner,   the   ECB   interest   rate   nor   the   direction   of   rate  
change.  Therefore,  any  argument  that  Sweden  would  gain  autonomy  from  joining  the  
Eurozone   and   getting   a   seat   at   the   table   where   interest   rates   are   set   is   invalid.  
Sweden’s  reluctance  to  forgo  its  monetary  policy  autonomy  from  the  nation-­state  to  a  
multi-­lateral  structure  (the  ECB)   is  a  display  of  realist  behaviour.  However,   this  can  
	   70	  
also  be  explained  in  a  rationalist  manner  as  well.  Sweden  wants  to  be  able  to  best  
manage   boom   and   bust   economic   cycles   that   occur   globally   and   nationally.   De  
Grauwe  (2016,  p.  151)  outlines  that  national  monetary  policy  is  a  useful  tool  for  dealing  
with  such  cycles.  Sweden’s  decision  to  retain  its  monetary  policy  is  rationalist  in  the  
sense  that  it  has  elected  to  do  this  to  better  manage  changing  economic  cycles.    
  
As  well  as  remaining  out  of  the  Eurozone,  Sweden  wants  to  stay  out  of  the  EBU.  There  
are  three  main  reasons  for  this.  Firstly,  Sweden  would  lose  its  ability  to  impose  tough  
financial  regulations  on  financial  institutions  if  it  were  to  join  the  EBU.  Secondly,  EBU-­
wide   regulations  may  be   ill-­suited   to   the  8300  banks   they  are  applicable   to  across  
Europe.  Thirdly,  Sweden  is  reluctant  to  have  any  financial  obligations  towards  paying  
for  recapitalization  of  banks  in  crisis.  Realism  explains  why  Sweden  does  not  want  to  
be  a  member  of  the  EBU,  and  rationalism  explains  how  they  stay  out  of  it.  Sweden  
wants  to  retain  control  over  its  own  regulations  and  not  sacrifice  these  to  multi-­lateral  
governance  in  the  form  of  the  EBU,  which  is  in  essence,  a  realist  form  of  behavior.  
Sweden's  reluctance  to  engage  in  cross-­border  recapitalization  of  banks  -­  which  could  
be  seen  as  a   form  of   international  cooperation   -­  has   realist   tendencies.  Sweden   is  
rationalist  in  the  way  it  avoids  EBU  membership;;  quite  simply,  it  does  not  want  to  join  
the  EBU  and  hence  stays  out  of  the  Eurozone  (which  would  bring  about  compulsory  
EBU  membership).  
  
The   Eurozone   debt   crisis   highlighted   a   myriad   of   reasons   that   would   put   off   any  
potential  candidate  for  Eurozone  membership.  The  crisis  demonstrated  the  effect  of  
negative  contagion  and  how  it  can  spread  through  an  economic  union  (Frieden  and  
Walter,  2017,  p.  5).  The  aforementioned  comparatively  poor  economic  statistics  of  the  
Eurozone   against   Sweden   are   a   testimony   to   this.   Acting   in   a   rational   way,   by  
remaining  out  of  the  Eurozone,  Sweden  has  avoided  experiencing  strong  contagion  
effects.   Sweden   has   also   managed   to   avoid   contributing   to   bailout   payments   for  
struggling   Eurozone   member   states   by   being   a   Eurozone   outsider   (Frieden   and  
Walter,  2017,  p.  5).  Similar  to  the  aforementioned  case  of  Sweden’s  reluctance  to  pay  
for   the   recapitalization   of   banks,   Sweden’s   avoidance   of   contributing   to   bailout  
payments  for  fellow  EU  member  states  by  staying  out  of  the  Eurozone  can  also  be  
recognized  as  a   realist  way  of  behaving   in   the   international  system.  The  Eurozone  
debt  crisis  gave  rise  to  the  SGP,  which  gives  the  European  Commission  authority  to  
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influence  the  fiscal  policies  of  Eurozone  members  (Lehner  and  Wasserfallen,  2019,  p.  
54).  As  a  realist  actor,  the  loss  of  fiscal  autonomy  from  the  nation-­state  to  multi-­lateral  
governance  concerns  Sweden,  thus  it  remains  out  of  the  Eurozone  so  as  not  to  be  
subject   to   the   SGP.   The   Eurozone   debt   crisis   has   also   opened   up   the   debate   of  
Eurozone  reform,  with  fiscal  transfer-­style  reforms  being  advocated  for  (De  Grauwe,  
2016,  p.  154).  These  reforms  would  also  see  Eurozone  members  sacrifice  their  fiscal  
policy  with  the  introduction  of  concepts  such  as  a  Eurozone-­wide  unemployment  fund.  
Sweden,  as  a  realist  actor,  stays  out  of   the  Eurozone  and  in  doing  so  avoids  fiscal  
autonomy   loss   as   a   result   of   these   potential   reforms.      The   Eurozone   economic  
recovery  plan  is  potentially  flawed,  as  De  Grauwe  (2016)  argues  that  it  is  a  liquidity  
trap.   From   a   perspective   of   rational   choice,   Sweden’s   decision   not   to   enter   the  
Eurozone  so  as  to  avert  a  failed  economic  recovery  is  logical.  The  inter-­union  tensions  
between  Eurozone  member  states  as  a  result  of  the  “north  vs  south”  and  “creditor  vs  
debtor”  relationships  highlight  issues  of  diplomacy  amongst  Eurozone  actors  (Reese  
and   Lauenstein,   2014,   p.   162-­163).   Approaching   this   from   a   constructivist   angle,  
Sweden  maintains  positive   relationships  with  other  EU  actors  by  staying  out  of   the  
Eurozone  and  hence  not  becoming  involved  in  said  tensions.  Looking  to  the  future,  
there  are  concerning  developments  occurring  in  the  Eurozone  currently  which  pose  
uncertainty  for  the  union  going  forth.    
	  
  
7.2  Critical  evaluations  
  
This   thesis   answers   the   research   questions   that  were   outlined   at   the   beginning   in  
chapter  1.  To  put  it  succinctly,  politically  there  is  not  enough  support  amongst  Swedish  
political   parties   to   enter   the   Eurozone.   Swedes   are   a   federo-­sceptic   people.   They  
favour  their  own  institutions  over  EU  institutions  and  thus  do  not  support  giving  EU  
institutions   greater   authority   over   their   country   through   Eurozone   membership.  
Economically,  the  effect  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis  has  had  on  the  Eurozone  has  been  
detrimental   to   it,  and  Sweden  outperforms  the  Eurozone  (in  an  economic  sense)   in  
almost  every  regard.  As  such,  Swedes  do  not  see  much  to  be  gained  from  becoming  
a  Eurozone  member.    
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There   are   a   number   of   limitations   which   this   thesis   experiences.   Firstly,   the  
geographical   and   financial   limitations   of   undertaking   research   in   New   Zealand.  
Financial  restrictions  have  meant  that  undertaking  an  investigation  of  this  nature  of  a  
country  in  Europe,  whilst  being  based  in  New  Zealand,  has  meant  that  it  has  not  been  
possible  to  conduct  primary  fieldwork  original  to  this  thesis  i.e.  a  survey  in  Sweden.  
However,  credible  alternatives,  such  as  Eurobarometer  surveys,  have  been  a  valuable  
substitute  as  well  as  a  way  of  addressing  this  limitation.  Secondly,  time  has  been  a  
limitation.  Economic  data  is  continuously  being  updated,  Eurobarometer  surveys  (of  
which  a  lot  of  this  investigation’s  social  research  is  based  upon)  are  being  conducted  
bi-­annually,  and  political  developments  are  changing  all  the  time  in  Sweden.  As  such,  
the  research  on  which  this  thesis  is  based  upon  will  likely  not  be  the  latest  and  most  
up  to  date  at  the  time  of  reading.  Finally,  for  a  thesis  of  this  size  there  is  a  limitation  in  
the   word   count.   It   would   have   been   interesting   to   make   a   comparison   between  
Denmark  and  Sweden,  as  two  Nordic  EU  member  states  both  outside  of  the  Eurozone.  
It  also  would  have  been   interesting   to  conduct  a   tri-­Nordic  comparison  of  Sweden,  
Denmark,  and  Finland  (as  a  Eurozone  member)  to  see  the  difference  in  the  economic  
impact  of  being  part  of  the  EMU.  However,  as  there  are  restrictions  on  the  word  count  
it  would  mean  that  there  would  not  have  been  space  to  rigorously  analyse  more  than  
one  country.    
  
As  the  limitations  show,  there  is  a  whole  larger  scope  of  investigation  relating  to  this  
topic,  particularly  with  the  incorporation  of  other  countries  into  the  research.  This  thesis  
offers  a  format  from  which  to  analyse  other  countries,  such  as  Denmark  and  Finland,  
regarding  the  consequences  of  their  respective  relationships  with  the  Eurozone.  The  
limitation   of   time   also   presents   an   opportunity   for   future   research.   It   would   be  
interesting  to  conduct  an  investigation  similar  to  the  nature  of  this  thesis  in  10  years’  
time,  and  make  a  comparison  with  the  existing  data  in  this  investigation,  highlighting  
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